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Chapter 1
Stock Market Return Volatility and Oil
Price Volatility
1.1 Introduction
Before 1973, the price of oil was fairly stable (see Figure 1.1). The U.S. Seven Sisters oil
companies stabilized the nominal oil price through production and price controls during
most years of the 20th century. After the Yom Kippur War started on October 6, 1973, the
increasing influence of OPEC on the crude oil market caused oil prices to start behaving like
prices of other commodities (Driesprong et al., 2008).
Oil shocks have long been considered an important determinant of GDP. Adelman (1993,
p. 537) states that,
“Oil is so significant in the international economy that forecasts of economic
growth are routinely qualified with the caveat: ‘Provided there is no oil shock.” ’
Estimates by the International Monetary Fund (Mussa, 2000) imply that a $5/barrel oil
price increase will cause the global economic growth rate to fall by 0.3 percent the following
year. In contrast to the volume of studies on the relationship between oil price changes and
the economy (see for example Mork, 1989; Lee et al., 1995; and Hamilton, 2003, among many
1
Figure 1.1: West Texas Intermediate oil price (US$/Barrel) from 1946 to 2012. Data are obtained from
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
others), fewer studies have investigated the relationship between oil prices and stock returns.
Surprisingly, the findings of these studies show almost no consensus among economists about
the link between stock prices and the oil prices.
Using a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) model, Kling (1985) studies oil shocks and
US stock market behavior and concludes that an increase in crude oil prices reduces future
stock prices in industries that use oil as input factors. In contrast, using the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory (APT), Chen et al. (1986) find no evidence for the influence of oil price
changes on asset prices in U.S. Using a standard cash-flow dividend valuation model with
quarterly data, Jones & Kaul (1996) test whether the international stock market reactions
to oil shocks can be justified by current and future fluctuations in real cash flows and/or
expected returns. They report that real oil price increases have a significant negative effect on
U.S., Canadian, Japanese, and UK aggregate stock returns. Huang et al. (1996) investigate
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the relationship between daily oil futures returns and daily US stock returns using a vector
autoregression model. They find that changes in the price of oil futures affect stock returns of
some individual oil companies, but they do not predict future aggregate stock returns like the
S&P 500. Sadorsky (1999) uses a vector autoregression model with four variables including
industrial production, interest rates, real oil prices, and real stock returns and finds that oil
price changes play an important role in stock market fluctuations. Driesprong et al. (2008)
find that an increase in oil prices drastically lowers future stock returns worldwide, in both
developed and emerging markets. They also show that the relationship between monthly
stock returns and lagged monthly oil price changes is strengthened when more lagged values
of oil price changes are included. Kilian & Park (2009) find that demand and supply shocks
in the oil market have different influences on U.S. real stock returns, and they jointly account
for 22 percent of the long-run variation in U.S. real stock returns.
In light of the literature on the relationship between oil price movements and stock
returns, it is natural to ask whether oil price volatility has predictive power for stock return
volatility. While prediction of stock returns using lagged oil prices may violate the principle
of market efficiency (see Driesprong et al., 2008), there is no theoretical reason that stock
return volatility should not be predictable, even in a market where stock prices fully reflect
all publicly available information.
To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between oil price volatility and stock
return volatility has received little attention in the literature, and the related studies are
limited in number. Using monthly data on industrial production, interest rates, oil prices,
and stock prices, Sadorsky (1999) estimates a vector autoregression model and finds that
oil price volatility significantly affects U.S. real stock returns. He also finds evidence of an
asymmetric effect of oil price volatility shocks on real U.S. stock returns. Sadorsky (2003)
finds that the conditional volatility of oil price, the term premium, and the consumer price
index each have significant impacts on the conditional volatility of technology stock prices.
Hammoudeh et al. (2004) use a GARCH model to examine the effect of crude oil market
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volatility on the equity return volatility of the S&P oil sector stock indices. They find
that the volatility of oil futures have a resonant effect on the volatility of the stock returns
in oil and gas exploration, production, and domestic integrated oil companies. Utilizing a
GARCH(1,1) technique, Elyasiani et al. (2011) find that oil return volatility has a strong
impact on excess stock return volatility in oil-related and oil-substitute industries, but they
do not see such predictability in other industries.
Using data for the S&P 500, CRSP aggregate markets, and fifteen individual industry
sectors, along with data for several measures of oil prices, including West Texas Intermediate
(WTI), the U.S. Producer Price Index (PPI) for crude oil and the Refiners’ Acquisition Cost
(RAC) for imported crude oil, this essay investigates whether oil price volatility predicts
stock return volatility. Our analysis covers the time period from October 1973 to December
2012.
This essay makes four important contributions to the literature. The first, and most
important, is that of testing for stock return volatility predictability. If stock returns can be
predicted by lagged oil price changes, as has been claimed in some of the literature discussed
above, it is plausible that stock return volatility can be predicted using lagged oil price
volatility. Second, we want to see how the relationship between oil price volatility and stock
return volatility has changed, if at all, through time. In other words, to forecast stock return
volatility in practice, it is necessary that the relationship is stable through time. Third,
we compare conditional return volatilities constructed from GARCH models with realized
return volatilities. Fourth, in contrast to the few related existing studies that rely only on
GARCH models to forecast volatility, we use an ordinary least squares (OLS) model that
provides results consistent with the methods used in the finance literature.
As mentioned earlier, for our investigation, we use two different measures of return volatil-
ity including realized return volatility (measured as the standard deviation of daily natu-
ral log returns over the course of a month) and conditional return volatility (measured as
GARCH(1,1) fitted values of monthly natural log returns). This measure is sometimes called
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the conditional standard deviation. Our findings show that these two return volatility mea-
sures provide similar results. In contrast to the findings of existing studies that a volatile oil
market is followed by future stock return volatility, our in-sample estimation results indicate
that oil price volatility does not have forecast power for future aggregate stock return volatil-
ity, and the current behavior of the stock return volatility is mainly explained by its prior
fluctuations. Our study distinguishes itself from the existing studies in that it examines the
forecasting relationship between oil price volatility and stock return volatility on a monthly
basis over different time periods. Also, variety of robustness checks confirm that our findings
are not an artifact of a particular choice of model specification and data series over a specific
time period. The existing studies either examine the forecasting relationship on a daily bases
(see Hammoudeh et al., 2004 and Elyasiani et al., 2011) or are limited to specific data series
and time period without considering the effect of prior values of stock return volatility on
its current values (see Sadorsky, 2003).
Our findings are largely robust to the use of other oil price series. Although the volatility
of the U.S. producer price index for crude oil shows predictive power for S&P 500 return
volatility over the period 1986:1-2012:12, this is the only evidence of predictability, and it is
not stable across other time periods. We do find evidence of a contemporaneous relationship
between oil price realized volatility and stock return realized volatility after 1986. That does
not hold when we use the conditional return volatility series generated by a GARCH(1,1)
model. The motivation for introducing realized volatility was to use all of the available data
when constructing a measure of the volatility of a time series (see Andersen & Bollerslev,
1998 and Andersen et al., 2003). A possible explanation for finding a contemporaneous rela-
tionship between the two volatility series only when using realized volatility measures is that
the GARCH(1,1) model discards most of the available data when making a monthly volatil-
ity prediction. This suggests that related future studies should not rely on only GARCH
models. For individual industry sectors, we find evidence of predictability in four out of
fifteen industries including chemicals, coal, rubber, and construction, but the relationship is
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stable only for the chemicals industry.
We check the robustness of our results to changes in the methodology in several ways.
A GARCH(1,1)-X specification that includes the lagged variance of oil price changes as an
exogenous regressor in the stock return variance equation delivers similar conclusions on the
absence of predictability. Impulse response function analysis finds no statistically significant
reaction of stock return volatility to an oil price volatility shock. Rolling-window estimates
of the prediction models uncover evidence of extreme time variation in the estimated param-
eters of the models that we estimate. An evaluation of out-of-sample stock return volatility
forecasts is consistent with the in-sample analysis - there is no advantage to predicting stock
return volatility using oil price volatility. We conclude that there is no evidence that oil price
volatility is a useful predictor for stock return volatility.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we discuss our data.
Section 1.3 describes the empirical methodology. Section 1.4 discusses the baseline empirical
results and the robustness tests. Section 1.5 contains concluding remarks.
1.2 Oil and stock market data
1.2.1 Oil price data
The crude oil market is the largest commodity market in the world. Between 70 and 80
million barrels of crude oil are produced daily worldwide, almost 25 percent of which is con-
sumed by the United States. Crude oil is traded daily on spot, futures, and over-the-counter
markets mostly at the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the International
Petroleum Exchange (IPE) in London (Levin et al., 2003).
Spot markets exist for different oil grades and are located in different regions (for example,
Rotterdam/Northwest Europe, Singapore/South East Asia, and Cushing, Oklahoma/U.S.
Gulf Coast). Most of them focus on prompt delivery of readily available supplies. For a
regional market to develop into a pricing center, some foundation in logistics are required
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Figure 1.2: Oil price development over the period 1984:1-2012:12 for West Texas Intermediate spot prices
(black dotted line) and one month futures prices (blue solid line). Data are obtained from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA).
such as ready supply, storage facilities, choices of transportation, and many sellers and
buyers. Spot prices in these different markets are reported by a variety of sources. There are
also futures markets for oil. In a futures contract, the seller agrees to deliver a given amount
of a commodity at a specified price, place, and future month (Driesprong et al., 2008).
Spot oil prices and oil futures prices tend to move closely together although these prices
are usually slightly different as shown in Figure 1.2.
Among different grades of crude oil, West Texas Intermediate, also known as Texas light
sweet, is often used as a benchmark for crude oil prices. West Texas Intermediate is light
because of its low density, and sweet due to its low sulfur content. Brent and Dubai are other
commonly cited oil prices. Generally the price of a lighter and sweeter oil grade is higher, as
it is cheaper to process. Since West Texas Intermediate is lighter and sweeter than Brent oil,
7
it is generally more expensive than Brent oil (and considerably more expensive than Dubai).
Cushing, Oklahoma, is the most active transport hub for West Texas Intermediate since it
has many intersecting pipelines, storage facilities and ready supply (Driesprong et al., 2008)
Empirical studies may be sensitive to the choice of oil price measure. Beside West Texas
Intermediate crude oil, the U.S. producer price index for crude oil, and the U.S. refiners’
acquisition cost for imported crude oil, for domestic crude oil, and for a composite of domestic
and imported crude oil are the most frequently used candidates for the oil price series in
the literature. However, there is no general consensus among researchers on which oil price
to use (Kilian & Vigfusson, 2011). For instance, Chen et al. (1986), Jones & Kaul (1996),
Sadorsky (1999), and Hamilton (2003), among others have used the U.S. producer price index
for crude oil, and Mork (1989), Kilian (2009), and Kilian & Vigfusson (2011), among others
have employed the refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil as a measure of oil prices
in their studies. Hamilton (2011) claims that when the goal is to test for asymmetries in the
shock transmission from oil price movements to U.S. real GDP, the U.S. producer price index
for crude oil is a more accurate proxy for imported crude oil than the refiners’ acquisition
cost, as it is more strongly correlated with the price of gasoline. Kilian & Vigfusson (2011)
argues that the logical conclusion of Hamilton’s reasoning is that we should always use the
retail price of gasoline rather than the price of oil since it is a good proxy for the retail
price of energy for consumers and firms. However, Hamilton’s reasoning is the basis for the
methodology in the empirical studies by Edelstein & Kilian (2009), Hamilton (2009), and
Ramey & Vine (2010).
Mork (1989) argued that the U.S. producer price of crude oil is not a good proxy for the
price of oil paid by firms. He argued that this oil price was controlled by the government for
much of the sample and as such may not reflect the true market price. Mork (1989, p. 741)
states that
“...during the price controls of the 1970s, this index is misleading because it
reflects only the controlled prices of domestically produced oil. However, since
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the price control system closely resembled a combined tax/subsidy scheme for
domestic and imported crude oil, the marginal cost of crude to U.S. refiners can
be approximated by the composite (for domestic and imported) refiner acquisition
cost for crude oil.”
Hence, it is unlikely that there is one price of oil that is appropriate for all purposes.
Hamilton (2011) suggests to check the sensitivity of the results using alternative oil price
measures. If similar results are obtained using different oil price measures, the results are
more reliable. Of course, a failure to find similar results across oil price series would not be
surprising, as it may reflect the measurement error in one or more of the series.
Our oil price data are daily and monthly spot prices of West Texas Intermediate. The
main reason to use West Texas Intermediate for our analysis is because it is known as a
benchmark for crude oil prices in the United States. West Texas Intermediate is the most
important and liquid market for crude oil in the United States and most of the domestic
crude oil grades are typically priced against its calendar monthly average. While Brent and
many other crude oil types are waterborne cargo markets, West Texas Intermediate is a
pipeline market where crude oil flows at near-constant rates into its mid-country delivery
point located in Cushing, Oklahoma. The other reason is that West Texas Intermediate,
to the best of our knowledge, has the longest available daily series for crude oil spot prices
starting from January 2, 1986. We use the daily West Texas Intermediate oil spot prices
from January 2, 1986 to December 31, 2012. For monthly data, our time period is from
October 1973, at the beginning of Yom Kippur War in October 1973 when oil prices started
to fluctuate, to December 2012. Hence, we base our results on 6812 daily observations and
471 monthly observations. West Texas Intermediate oil price series are available in Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website. We have used the natural log returns (ln Pt
Pt−1
) of
daily and monthly West Texas Intermediate spot prices.
In order to show the robustness of our results to the use of other oil price series, we also
consider the monthly U.S. producer price index for crude oil favored by Hamilton and the
9
Figure 1.3: West Texas Intermediate (solid line), refiners’ acquisition cost (dotted line), and the U.S.
producer price index for crude oil (dashed line) fluctuations over the period 1974:1-2012:12. Data are
obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude. These oil price series are not available daily.
The monthly refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil is available starting in January
1974. Both of these oil price series cover the period from January 1974 to December 2012 and
are obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Natural log returns
of the U.S. producer price index for crude oil and the refiners’ acquisition cost for imported
crude oil are used. Even though price differences do exist, our oil prices series tend to follow
similar trends over time, as shown in Figure 1.3.
1.2.2 Stock market data
For our investigation we calculate daily and monthly log returns of both the Standard and
Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) stock market index and the Center for Research in Security Prices
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(CRSP) value-weighted market portfolio. S&P 500 stock prices and CRSP value-weighted
returns data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) and Kenneth
French’s websites, respectively.1 We use CRSP value-weighted portfolio since the value-
weighted indices exhibit less autocorrelation relative to equally-weighted indices. Moreover,
value-weighted indices are less affected by the January effect, as the January effect is highly
related to the small firm effect (see Hawawini & Keim, 1995). Furthermore, daily and
monthly value-weighted returns for fifteen oil sensitive industry sectors are obtained from
Kenneth French’s website.2 Our industry-level data are constructed from the CRSP database
and therefore are consistent with our aggregate CRSP stock returns data. The investigated
industries are: Petroleum and Natural Gas, Automobiles and Trucks, Retail, Precious Met-
als, Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products, Construction, Steel works, Machinery, Air-
craft, Shipbuilding and Railroad Equipment, Coal, Utilities, Banking, and Insurance. Daily
and monthly log returns on our industry-level data are also calculated. Daily data series
start on January 2, 1986 and end on December 31, 2012. Monthly data cover the period
1973:10-2012:12.
Return Volatility
For our investigation, we use two methods for calculating the volatility of the stock return
and oil price series:
Realized return volatility
Our measure of realized volatility is the sample standard deviation, which has been ex-
tensively used as a measure of volatility in the existing literature (see French et al., 1987;
Schwert, 1989; Fleming, 1998; Christensen & Prabhala, 1998; Andersen et al., 2003; and
Bandi & Perron, 2006, among others). To construct monthly realized return volatility, we
1See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/datalibrary.html.
2See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/datalibrary.html. We use the
file containing 49 industry portfolios.
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compute the standard deviation of daily natural log returns over the course of a month. In
this study, monthly realized return volatility of both oil and stock markets are used. An
advantage of the realized volatility measure relative to other methods, including GARCH
models, is that one is able to use all of the daily observations to construct a measure of
monthly volatility. To our knowledge, no published papers have looked at the relationship
between stock return volatility and oil price volatility using realized volatility measures.
Conditional return volatility
It is common to construct estimates of conditional volatility using low order generalized au-
toregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) model (see Bollerslev, 1986 and Bollerslev
et al., 1992). A univariate regression with GARCH(p,q) error process can be represented as
εt =
√
hzt, εt | ψt−1 ∼ N(0, ht), t = 1, ..., T (1.1)
and
ht = ω +
q∑
i=1
γiε
2
t−i +
p∑
j=1
ϕjht−j, (1.2)
where zt ∼ iid(0, 1), εt is a stochastic process, and ψt−1 is the information set available at
time t− 1. For a GARCH(1,1) model, the conditional variance is defined as
ht = ω + γ1ε
2
t−1 + ϕ1ht−1. (1.3)
We fit a univariate GARCH(1,1) model to the monthly log returns of West Texas Inter-
mediate spot prices and monthly stock log returns to construct monthly conditional volatility
(conditional standard deviation) of oil returns and stock returns, respectively.3
3Bollerslev et al. (1992) recommend using a low order GARCH model, particularly GARCH(1,1).
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Table 1.1: GARCH(1,1) estimates for West Texas Intermediate monthly log returns over the period 1973:10-
2012:12.
Parameter Estimate t-value
ω 0.0008 1.00
γ1 0.102 0.90
ϕ1 0.754 5.57
Table 1.1 shows the GARCH(1,1) estimates for West Texas Intermediate monthly log
returns over the period 1973:10-2012:12. γ1 + ϕ1 = 0.856 denotes that the conditional
variance of West Texas Intermediate log returns is very persistent, indicating that a shock
to its price changes variance decays slowly. Bollerslev (1986) shows that in the univariate
GARCH model defined by equation (1.2),
∑q
i=1 γi +
∑p
j=1 ϕj < 1 is a sufficient condition
for strict covariance stationarity. Nelson (1990) shows that in a GARCH(1,1) model, when
ω > 0, the conditional variance is strictly stationary if and only if E[ln(γz2t + ϕ1)] < 0. In
a simple GARCH(1,1) model with zt ∼ N(0, 1), an easy application of Jensen’s inequality
shows
E[ln(γz2t + ϕ1)] < ln[E(γz
2
t + ϕ1)] = ln(γ1 + ϕ1), (1.4)
which implies that a GARCH(1,1) model with ω > 0, is strict stationary if γ1 + ϕ1 ≤ 1
and is strictly covariance stationary if γ1 + ϕ1 < 1 (see Bollerslev et al., 1994 for related
discussions). This indicates that the conditional West Texas Intermediate price volatility is
strictly both covariance stationary and variance stationary.
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics of monthly price volatility for West Texas In-
termediate. Both realized and conditional West Texas Intermediate price volatility series
are significantly skewed and show significantly high kurtosis, indicating that the extreme
values are prevalent across West Texas Intermediate price volatility series.We reject the null
hypothesis of normal distribution based on the Jarque-Bera (J-B) test statistics, and the
Ljung-Box (L-B) Q-statistic reveals the presence of first order serial correlation in both re-
alized and conditional oil price volatility series. The Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected
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Table 1.2: Basic characteristics of monthly West Texas Intermediate realized price volatility over the period
1986:1-2012:12 and conditional price volatility over the period 1973:10-2012:12. We test the null hypothesis
of no skewness using D’Agostino test. To test kurtosis, we use Anscombe-Glynn test with the null hypothesis
of kurtosis is equal to three to detect whether there is a significant difference from the kurtosis of normally
distributed data. The critical values for ADF and PP at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are -3.44, -2.87, and
-2.57, respectively. ρ(1) denotes the coefficient in an autoregressive regression of order one (AR(1)) on West
Texas Intermediate price volatility. * and ** indicate significant p-values at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Pair-wise correlation over the period 1986:1-2012:12 is also reported.
West Texas Intermediate Realized volatility Conditional volatility
Obs. 324 471
Mean 0.022 0.079
Maximum 0.109 0.293
Minimum 0.007 0.060
Skewness 2.48** 4.02**
Kurtosis 12.98** 25.90**
L-B 104.46** 348.88**
ADF -5.55 -7.09
PP -9.76 -6.13
J-B 1679.32** 11564.78**
ρ(1) 0.56** 0.85**
Pairwise correlation between West Texas Intermediate price realized and conditional volatility is 0.61.
across both realized and conditional oil price volatility series at one percent level. Highly
significant ρ(1) also confirm the results of Ljung-Box test. However, the results of higher
order West Texas Intermediate volatility AR regressions (not reported) showed that only up
to two-month lagged oil price volatility is significant, indicating that a shock to West Texas
Intermediate price volatility series decays quickly.
Table 1.3 shows the GARCH(1,1) estimates for S&P 500 and CRSP monthly log returns
over the period 1973:10-2012:12. γ1+ϕ1 equal to 0.932 and 0.956 in S&P 500 and CRSP ag-
gregate markets, respectively show that the conditional variances of aggregate stock returns
are persistent, indicating that a shock to their returns variance decays slowly, but the stock
return volatility series are still strictly stationary. Table 1.4 presents the summary statis-
tics of monthly realized and conditional return volatility in two aggregate markets including
S&P 500 and CRSP. All market return volatility series show significantly high skewness and
kurtosis. The Jarque-Bera test statistics, and the Ljung-Box Q-statistic reject the null of
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Table 1.3: GARCH(1,1) estimates for S&P 500 and CRSP monthly log returns over the period 1973:10-
2012:12.
S&P 500 CRSP
Parameter Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
ω 0.0001 1.36 0.0001 1.16
γ1 0.179 2.55 0.103 2.28
ϕ1 0.753 8.85 0.853 17.97
Table 1.4: Basic characteristics of monthly stock realized return volatility over the period 1986:1-2012:12
and conditional return volatility over the period 1973:10-2012:12 for S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets.
We test the null hypothesis of no skewness using D’Agostino test. To test kurtosis, we use Anscombe-Glynn
test with the null hypothesis of kurtosis is equal to three to detect whether there is a significant difference
from the kurtosis of normally distributed data. The critical values for ADF and PP at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels are -3.44, -2.87, and -2.57, respectively. * and ** indicate significant p-values at 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Realized volatility
Market Obs. Mean Min Max Skew Kurt L-B ADF PP J-B
S&P 500 324 0.010 0.003 0.061 3.49** 22.05** 128.37 -4.32 -8.81 5561.14**
CRSP 324 0.009 0.002 0.052 3.05** 16.89** 139.68** -4.34 -8.57 3109.48**
Conditional volatility
S&P 500 471 0.037 0.022 0.108 2.09** 9.44** 371.81** -4.45 -5.25 1158**
CRSP 471 0.046 0.030 0.095 1.18** 4.49** 405.59** -3.80 -4.39 184.73**
normal distribution and reveal the presence of first order serial correlation, respectively, in
both investigated markets. The Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP)
test statistics exceed the critical values at the one percent level in all cases. Hence, the null
hypothesis of unit root is also rejected across all markets.
Table 1.5 reports the results of the AR estimation equation (1.5) of order up to three for
both S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets.
rvolmarkett = µ1 +
∑
i
βirvol
market
t−i + εt, (1.5)
where rvolmarket denotes stock return volatility. The results indicate that a shock to the
stock market return volatility dies out very fast, and higher than first order autocorrelations
tend to be small and insignificant. However, Breusch-Godfrey test results (not reported)
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Table 1.5: Estimation results of equation (1.5) for S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets. We report the
results over the periods 1986:1-2012:12 for realized return volatility series and 1973:10-2012:12 for conditional
return volatility series. * and ** indicate significant coefficients at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, based
on White standard errors.
Realized volatility
S&P 500 CRSP
Coefficients AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3)
β1 0.63** 0.52** 0.50* 0.63** 0.54** 0.53**
β2 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.11
β3 0.09 0.08
Conditional volatility
β1 0.88** 0.93** 0.93** 0.92** 0.96** 0.96**
β2 -0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06
β3 0.06 0.02
show the presence of autocorrelation of orders higher than one in the error term of the
AR(1) regressions on realized stock return volatility in both S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate
markets. For the AR(1) regressions on conditional market return volatility, the Breusch-
Godfrey test does not indicate the presence of autocorrelation of orders higher than one.
Based on these basic characteristics, when justified, we use heteroskedasticity consistent or
White standard errors in the remainder of our analysis that also adjust for the high level
of kurtosis (see White, 1980). However, when Breusch-Godfrey test shows the presence of
autocorrelation of orders higher than one, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
or Newey West standard errors are used.
1.3 Basic regression model
To investigate the interaction between oil price volatility and stock return volatility, we
estimate a linear regression by ordinary least squares. The primary OLS regression equation
is
rvolmarkett = µ1 +
∑
i=1
αirvol
oil
t−i + εt, i = 1, ..., T, (1.6)
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where rvolmarket and rvolOil are our measures of market return volatility and oil price volatil-
ity, respectively. µ1 is a constant, and εt is the usual error term.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 In-sample predictions
Table 1.6 contains the in-sample prediction results of equation (1.6) for the S&P 500 and
CRSP stock markets and for West Texas Intermediate using realized and conditional return
volatility series. Based on the results, realized price volatility of West Texas Intermediate
does not significantly predict market return volatility in both S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate
markets at 5 percent level during the period 1986:1-2012:12. Conditional price volatility of
West Texas Intermediate also shows no significant predictive power for stock return volatil-
ity in both aggregate markets during the period 1973:10-2012:12. The positive estimated
coefficient α1 implies that an increase in oil price volatility this month causes higher stock
return volatility next month, but this effect is not statistically significant. We also fail to
reject the hypothesis that the West Texas Intermediate price volatility does not Granger
cause stock return volatility. In order to test how robust these results are in relation to the
correlation of current stock return volatility and its prior values, we run regressions in which
in addition to lags of oil price volatility, we include lags of stock return volatility (regression
equation (1.7)). Also, we jointly include the current oil price volatility and the lags of stock
return volatility in addition to lags of oil price volatility in a separate regression (regression
equation (1.8)) to see if it influences the results.
rvolmarkett = µ1 +
∑
i=1
αirvol
oil
t−i +
∑
i=1
βirvol
market
t−i + εt. (1.7)
rvolmarkett = µ1 + α0rvol
oil
t +
∑
i=1
αirvol
oil
t−i +
∑
i=1
βirvol
market
t−i + εt. (1.8)
In Table 1.7 we report the estimates of equations (1.7) and (1.8). To facilitate comparison
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Table 1.6: In-sample estimation results of equation (1.6) for S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets and for
West Texas Intermediate. * and ** indicate significant coefficients at 5% and 1% level, respectively based on
Newey West standard errors. BIC values indicate that the lag length is equal to one. For Granger causality
test, p-values are reported, lag lengths are determined based on BIC and H0 is: oil price volatility does not
Granger cause market return volatility.
1986:1-2012:12 1973:10-2012:12
Realized volatility Conditional volatility
Market α1 R2 Granger causality α1 R2 Granger causality
S&P 500 0.14 0.06 0.533 0.17 0.12 0.417
CRSP 0.14 0.07 0.602 0.13 0.08 0.226
with our previous results, the results of equation (1.5) are also included. To confirm that the
evidence of predictability cannot be attributed to a specific time period, we report results
for the sample period of Driesprong et al. (2008), which is the the subperiod ending in April
2003. Furthermore, consistent with realized return volatility series, the results for conditional
return volatility are also reported over the subperiods start January 1986. For equation (1.6),
with the exception of the results over the period 1973:10-2012:12 that are discussed earlier
in Table 1.6, we find no statistically significant evidence of predictability of S&P 500 return
volatility in any of the investigated subperiods. However, when using the CRSP conditional
return volatility series, the estimated coefficient is significant at a five percent level over
the period 1986:1-2012:12. Over all of the investigated subperiods, Granger causality test
results do not indicate that West Texas Intermediate price volatility has predictive power for
stock return volatility. The predictability shown in the results of equation (1.6) for CRSP
volatility over the period 1986:1-2012:12 is not robust to the inclusion of lagged stock return
volatility. The results of equation (1.7) show that stock return volatility is mainly affected
by itself lagged one period, and West Texas Intermediate price volatility has no significant
predictive power for market return volatility.
The results from estimating equation (1.7) demonstrate that the inability of oil price
volatility to predict stock return volatility is robust to the presence of contemporaneous oil
price volatility. For conditional volatility, the estimation results for equation (1.8) indicates
neither current oil price volatility nor one-month lagged oil price volatility significantly in-
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fluenced current stock return volatility in any of the investigated time periods. For realized
volatility, however, there is strong evidence of an effect of contemporaneous oil price volatility.
The coefficient on current West Texas Intermediate price volatility is significantly different
from zero for both aggregate markets and over both of the time periods 1986:1-2012-12 and
1986:1-2003-4.
Our in-sample prediction results provide no support for the hypothesis that oil price
volatility leads stock return volatility, but there is evidence of a significant contemporaneous
interaction between stock return volatility and oil price volatility after 1986. We also checked
the robustness of our results to the use of real stock return volatility and excess stock
return volatility rather than total returns. Real stock returns and excess stock returns were
calculated by subtracting the inflation rate and one-month Treasury bill rate from stock
returns, respectively. Inflation rates were calculated using the U.S. CPI. The results (not
reported) showed that in both cases, the parameter estimates and related p-values were only
marginally different from our reported results.
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Table 1.7: In-sample estimation results of equation (1.6) compared with the results of equations (1.7) and
(1.8) for S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets and for West Texas Intermediate. The results of equation
(1.6) are based on Newey West standard errors. The results of equations (1.7) and (1.8) are based on White
standard errors. * and ** indicate significant coefficients at 5% and 1% level, respectively. BIC values
indicate that the lag length is equal to one in all of these regression equations. Adj.R2s are reported in
parentheses. For Granger causality test, p-values are reported, lag lengths are determined based on BIC and
H0 is: oil price volatility does not Granger cause market return volatility.
Realized volatility 1986:1-2012:12
Eq. (1.6) Eq. (1.7) Eq. (1.8)
Market α1 α1 β1 α0 α1 β1 Granger causality
S&P 500 0.14 0.03 0.60** 0.12** -0.03 0.58** 0.533
(0.06) (0.39) (0.42)
CRSP 0.14 0.02 0.63** 0.12** -0.04 0.61** 0.602
(0.07) (0.42) (0.46)
Realized volatility 1986:1-2003:4
S&P 500 0.02 -0.000 0.45** 0.07** -0.03 0.45** 0.915
(0.00) (0.19) (0.21)
CRSP 0.03 -0.001 0.49** 0.07** -0.04 0.50** 0.895
(0.00) (0.24) (0.26)
Conditional volatility 1973:10-2012:12
S&P 500 0.17 0.01 0.87** 0.04 -0.03 0.87** 0.417
(0.12) (0.78) (0.78)
CRSP 0.13 0.01 0.91** 0.01 -0.003 0.91** 0.226
(0.08) (0.85) (0.85)
Conditional volatility 1973:10-2003:4
S&P 500 0.09 0.01 0.90** 0.006 0.005 0.90** 0.184
(0.05) (0.83) (0.82)
CRSP 0.04 0.006 0.93** -0.000 0.007 0.93** 0.172
(0.03) (0.87) (0.87)
Conditional volatility 1986:1-2012:12
S&P 500 0.23 0.003 0.84** 0.15 -0.10 0.81** 0.878
(0.14) (0.70) (0.73)
CRSP 0.19* 0.01 0.92** 0.05 -0.02 0.92** 0.317
(0.10) (0.87) (0.87)
Conditional volatility 1986:1-2003:4
S&P 500 0.05 -0.002 0.90** 0.05 -0.03 0.90** 0.846
(0.01) (0.80) (0.81)
CRSP 0.04 -0.000 0.95** 0.01 -0.008 0.95** 0.974
(0.01) (0.91) (0.91)
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As another robustness check, we estimate a GARCH(1,1) model for stock returns that
allows us to include lagged oil price changes directly as an exogenous regressor in the condi-
tional variance equation (a GARCH(1,1)-X model; see, for instance, Engle & Patton, 2001).
The conditional variance equation can be written as
ht = ω + γ1ε
2
t−1 + ϕ1ht−1 + φrvar
oil
t−1, (1.9)
where rvaroil is the conditional variance of oil price changes that is obtained by fitting a
GARCH(1,1) model to monthly West Texas Intermediate log returns. Then, we compare the
estimated coefficients of equation (1.9) with the estimated coefficients obtained from fitting
a univariate GARCH(1,1) model to stock returns.
Table 1.8 contains the estimated coefficients of the GARCH(1,1)-X and GARCH(1,1)
variance equations. The results show that the lagged variance of West Texas Intermediate
does not affect the variance of stock returns as γ1 and ϕ1 are not affected and φ is close
to zero and insignificant over all of the investigated time periods. This implies that oil
price volatility does not have a significant predictive power for stock return volatility. These
results are consistent with our in-sample prediction findings.
In Table 1.7, the results based on the conditional return volatility series show that β1 is
close to one in both equations (1.7) and (1.8) over all of the subsamples. Furthermore, in
Table 1.8, γ + ϕ1 is close to one in all of the subsamples. This implies that the persistence
in the conditional volatility of aggregate stock returns is very high - close to a unit root. As
discussed earlier, the evidence shows that our conditional return volatility series are strictly
stationary based on the ADF and PP tests shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.4. The tests indicate
that there is no unit root across conditional West Texas Intermediate price volatility and
aggregate stock (S&P500 and CRSP) return volatility. Nonetheless, the regression models
still indicate a possible problem. The possibility of a unit root in the volatility of asset returns
has been studied by numerous authors, leading to the integrated GARCH (IGARCH) model,
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Table 1.8: GARCH(1,1)-X and GARCH(1,1) estimation results for S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets
and for West Texas Intermediate. * and ** indicate significant coefficients based on robust standard errors
at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
1973:10-2012:12
GARCH(1,1)-X GARCH(1,1)
Market ω γ1 ϕ1 φ ω γ1 ϕ1
S&P 500 0.0001 0.1795* 0.7537** 0.0000 0.0001 0.1795* 0.7537**
CRSP 0.0001 0.1030* 0.8531** 0.0000 0.0001 0.1030* 0.8531**
1973:10-2003:4
S&P 500 0.00009 0.1273** 0.8104** 0.0000 0.00009 0.1273** 0.8104**
CRSP 0.0001 0.0459 0.8983** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0459 0.8983**
1986:1-2012:12
S&P 500 0.00013 0.2847 0.6627** 0.0000 0.00013 0.2847 0.6627**
CRSP 0.00005 0.1295* 0.8571** 0.0000 0.00005 0.1295* 0.8571**
1986:1-2003:4
S&P 500 0.00006 0.1950* 0.7800** 0.0000 0.00006 0.1950* 0.7800**
CRSP 0.00004 0.0559 0.9266** 0.0000 0.00004 0.0559 0.9266**
reviewed in Bollerslev et al. (1994). The IGARCH model introduced by Engle & Bollerslev
(1986) is a restricted version of the GARCH model shown in equation (1.2), where the
coefficients sum up to one (
∑q
i=1 γi +
∑p
j=1 ϕj = 1), implying the existence of permanent
shocks to the conditional variance. However, as discussed above, IGARCH models with
ω > 0 are strictly stationary.
In order to test for a unit root, we first fit an IGARCH(1,1) model to West Texas Inter-
mediate and the aggregate stock return series to see if the estimated ω is greater than zero.
The results shown in Table 1.9 reveal that ω is not equal to zero, though it is very small, over
all of the subsamples. Hence, the IGARCH(1,1) conditional volatility series are strictly sta-
tionary. In Table 1.9 we also report the results of equation (1.9) using an IGARCH (1,1)-X
model, where the exogenous regressor is the lagged oil price conditional variance constructed
from fitting an IGARCH(1,1) model to West Texas Intermediate monthly returns. The re-
sults show that φ is zero and insignificant over all of the investigated time periods. Also, the
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Table 1.9: IGARCH(1,1)-X and IGARCH(1,1) estimation results for S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets
and for West Texas Intermediate. * and ** indicate significant coefficients based on robust standard errors
at 5% and 1% level, respectively. p-value of ϕ1 is not obtained.
1973:10-2012:12
IGARCH(1,1)-X IGARCH(1,1)
Market ω γ1 ϕ1 φ ω γ1 ϕ1
S&P 500 0.00005 0.2110** 0.7889 0.0000 0.00005 0.2110** 0.7889
CRSP 0.00004 0.1371** 0.8628 0.0000 0.00004 0.1371** 0.8628
1973:10-2003:4
S&P 500 0.00003 0.1539** 0.8460 0.0000 0.00003 0.1539** 0.8460
CRSP 0.00002 0.0810** 0.9189 0.0000 0.00002 0.0810** 0.9189
1986:1-2012:12
S&P 500 0.00008 0.2951 0.7048 0.0000 0.00008 0.2951 0.7048
CRSP 0.00004 0.1429** 0.8570 0.0000 0.00004 0.1429** 0.8570
1986:1-2003:4
S&P 500 0.00004 0.2053* 0.7946 0.0000 0.00004 0.2053* 0.7946
CRSP 0.00002 0.0759** 0.9240 0.0000 0.00002 0.0759** 0.9240
estimated γ1 and ϕ1 are not different from their corresponding values in the IGARCH(1,1)
model, and only slightly different from the values reported in Table 1.8. In addition, we
reestimated equation (1.8) using the IGARCH(1,1) strictly stationary return volatility se-
ries. The results are reported in Table 1.10. The results show that in all of the estimated
time periods β1 is close to one in both aggregate markets. The findings of these tests are
fully consistent with our previous findings that oil price volatility does not have significant
predictive power for stock return volatility, and imply that there is not a unit root problem
in the results reported in Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
As an additional check, we reestimated equation (1.8) with two, three, and four lags.
The results (not reported) showed that β1 is still close to one. There is again no evidence
that oil price volatility has significant predictive power for aggregate stock return volatility.
Repeating the estimation of equation (1.8) with one lag using the first differenced return
volatility series (rather than the levels of the return volatility series) does not change the
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Table 1.10: In-sample estimation results of equation (1.8) using an IGARCH(1,1) model to construct
conditional return volatility series. The results are reported based on White standard errors. * and **
indicate significant coefficients at 5% and 1% level, respectively. Lag lengths are determined based on BIC.
1973:10-2012:12
Market α0 α1 β1
S&P 500 0.04 -0.02 0.89**
CRSP 0.01 -0.02 0.92**
1973:10-2003:4
S&P 500 0.006 0.003 0.92**
CRSP -0.000 0.009 0.94**
1986:1-2012:12
S&P 500 0.11 -0.09 0.84**
CRSP 0.04 -0.02 0.92**
1986:1-2003:4
S&P 500 0.04 -0.03 0.91**
CRSP 0.01 -0.008 0.95**
finding either. Even if there is a unit root in the volatility series, it has no effect on the
results shown in Table 1.7.
Our in-sample prediction results may raise the question “what about other oil price series
and individual industry sectors?” To answer this question we reestimate equation (1.8)
using the U.S producer price index for crude oil, the refiners’ acquisition cost for imported
crude oil, and industry level stock data of fifteen oil sensitive sectors including Petroleum
and Natural Gas, Automobiles and Trucks, Retail, Precious Metals, Chemicals, Rubber and
Plastic Products, Construction, Steel works, Machinery, Aircraft, Shipbuilding and Railroad
Equipment, Coal, Utilities, Banking, and Insurance. Since daily data for both the U.S
producer price index for crude oil and the refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil
are not available, only conditional volatility series are used for this analysis. The results are
shown in Tables 1.11 and 1.12.
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Table 1.11: In-sample estimation results of equation (1.8) for S&P 500, CRSP and fifteen individual oil
sensitive sectors and for WTI, PPI and RAC. The results are reported based on White standard errors. *
and ** indicate significant coefficients at 5% and 1% level, respectively. Lag lengths are determined based
on BIC.
1974:1-2012:12
West Texas Intermediate Producer Price Index Refiners’ Acquisition Cost
Market α0 α1 β1 α0 α1 β1 α0 α1 β1
S&P 500 0.07 -0.06 0.87** 0.08 -0.07 0.86** 0.04 -0.03 0.86**
CRSP 0.03 -0.02 0.91** 0.04 -0.03 0.91** 0.01 -0.01 0.91**
Petroleum 0.02 -0.01 0.91** -0.000 0.000 0.91** 0.003 -0.003 0.91**
Automobiles 0.08 -0.04 0.88** 0.10 -0.07 0.87** 0.05 -0.02 0.88**
Retail 0.02 -0.01 0.82** 0.03 -0.02 0.82** 0.01 -0.007 0.82**
Precious Metals 0.06 -0.04 0.85** 0.05 -0.04 0.85** 0.03 -0.02 0.85**
Chemicals 0.04* -0.02 0.90** 0.04* -0.03* 0.90** 0.02** -0.02** 0.90**
Rubber 0.01 0.002 0.89** 0.02 -0.01 0.89** 0.01 -0.002 0.90**
Construction 0.02 -0.01 0.76** 0.04 -0.03 0.76** 0.01 -0.008 0.76**
Steel works 0.02 0.003 0.92** 0.02 -0.004 0.92** 0.02 -0.005 0.92**
Machinery 0.05 -0.03 0.77** 0.06 -0.04 0.76** 0.03 -0.02 0.77**
Aircraft 0.02 -0.02 0.90** 0.03 -0.03 0.90** 0.02 -0.02 0.90**
Shipbuilding 0.004 0.008 0.92** 0.01 -0.000 0.92** 0.003 0.005 0.92**
Coal 0.05* -0.03 0.97** 0.05* -0.04* 0.97** 0.03* -0.02* 0.97**
Utilities 0.008 0.001 0.91** 0.01 -0.009 0.91** 0.009 -0.002 0.90**
Banking 0.02 0.01 0.89** 0.04 -0.02 0.89** 0.01 0.01 0.89**
Insurance 0.08 -0.04 0.78** 0.09 -0.07 0.78** 0.03 -0.002 0.78**
1974:1-2003:4
S&P 500 0.01 -0.01 0.90** 0.03 -0.03 0.90** 0.01 -0.01 0.90**
CRSP 0.004 -0.003 0.92** 0.01 -0.01 0.92** 0.002 -0.003 0.92**
Petroleum 0.02 -0.01 0.93** -0.002 0.002 0.92** 0.002 -0.004 0.92**
Automobiles 0.01 -0.002 0.93** 0.02 -0.01 0.93** 0.009 -0.003 0.93**
Retail 0.004 0.002 0.65** 0.01 -0.008 0.65** 0.002 0.000 0.65**
Precious Metals -0.000 0.006 0.87** -0.006 0.01 0.87** -0.003 -0.000 0.87**
Chemicals 0.006 -0.005 0.92** 0.009 -0.008 0.92** 0.005 -0.004** 0.92**
Rubber 0.003 -0.001 0.92** 0.008 -0.006 0.92** 0.003 -0.002 0.92**
Construction 0.002 -0.000 0.88** 0.01 -0.01 0.88** 0.003 -0.002 0.88**
Steel works -0.007 0.01 0.96** -0.000 0.01 0.95** 0.003 0.000 0.96**
Machinery 0.01 -0.005 0.86** 0.01 -0.01 0.85** 0.007 -0.005 0.85**
Aircraft 0.008 -0.01 0.90** 0.02 -0.03 0.90** 0.01 -0.01 0.90**
Shipbuilding 0.000 0.000 0.95** 0.000 0.000 0.95** 0.000 0.000 0.95**
Coal 0.02 -0.02 0.98** 0.03 -0.03 0.97** 0.01 -0.01 0.97**
Utilities 0.003 0.003 0.94** 0.01 -0.01 0.94** 0.006 -0.000 0.93**
Banking 0.01 -0.005 0.75** 0.03 -0.02 0.74** 0.005 -0.000 0.75**
Insurance 0.02 -0.001 0.64** 0.04 -0.03 0.64** -0.000 0.01 0.64**
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Table 1.12: In-sample estimation results of equation (1.8) for S&P 500, CRSP and fifteen individual oil
sensitive sectors and for WTI, PPI and RAC. The results are reported based on White standard errors. *
and ** indicate significant coefficients at 5% and 1% level, respectively. Lag lengths are determined based
on BIC.
1986:1-2012:12
West Texas Intermediate Producer Price Index Refiners’ Acquisition Cost
Market α0 α1 β1 α0 α1 β1 α0 α1 β1
S&P 500 0.15 -0.10 0.81** 0.18* -0.15* 0.81** 0.13 -0.08 0.80**
CRSP 0.05 -0.02 0.92** 0.07* -0.05 0.92** 0.04 -0.02 0.92**
Petroleum 0.01 -0.01 0.95** 0.006 -0.002 0.95** 0.008 -0.005 0.95**
Automobiles 0.14 -0.07 0.85** 0.19 -0.13 0.85** 0.14 -0.07 0.85**
Retail 0.10 -0.03 0.60** 0.14 -0.07 0.60** 0.10 -0.03 0.60**
Precious Metals 0.14 -0.08 0.20 0.15 -0.07 0.19 0.15 -0.08 0.19
Chemicals 0.06* -0.03 0.92** 0.07** -0.05* 0.92** 0.06** -0.03** 0.93**
Rubber 0.02 0.007 0.92** 0.05 -0.01 0.92** 0.03 -0.002 0.93**
Construction 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.11* -0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.05
Steel works 0.04 0.000 0.92** 0.04 -0.01 0.92** 0.05 -0.01 0.92**
Machinery 0.10 -0.05 0.78** 0.12 -0.08 0.77** 0.10 -0.05 0.77**
Aircraft 0.06 -0.04 0.88** 0.06 -0.06 0.89** 0.06 -0.05 0.88**
Shipbuilding 0.004 0.01 0.93** 0.02 0.007 0.93** 0.01 0.009 0.93**
Coal 0.05 -0.04 0.98** 0.08* -0.07* 0.98** 0.06* -0.04* 0.98**
Utilities 0.01 0.001 0.90** 0.03 -0.01 0.90** 0.02 -0.01 0.90**
Banking 0.03 0.04 0.90** 0.09* -0.01 0.89** 0.03 0.03 0.90**
Insurance 0.16 -0.02 0.71** 0.22 -0.12 0.71** 0.13 -0.009 0.71**
1986:1-2003:4
S&P 500 0.05 -0.03 0.90** 0.10 -0.09 0.90** 0.06 -0.04 0.89**
CRSP 0.01 -0.008 0.95** 0.02 -0.02 0.95** 0.01 -0.01 0.95**
Petroleum 0.02 -0.01 0.94** 0.008 -0.001 0.94** 0.01 -0.01 0.94**
Automobiles 0.02 -0.009 0.95** 0.04 -0.03 0.95** 0.02 -0.01 0.95**
Retail 0.04 -0.000 0.43** 0.09 -0.05 0.43** 0.07 -0.02 0.44**
Precious Metals -0.002 0.001 0.18 0.007 0.04 0.18 0.02 -0.02 0.18
Chemicals 0.01* -0.006 0.95** 0.01* -0.01 0.95** 0.01* -0.01** 0.95**
Rubber 0.01 -0.005 0.95** 0.02* -0.01* 0.95** 0.01 -0.01 0.95**
Construction 0.002 -0.000 0.92** 0.008** -0.005* 0.92** 0.004* -0.001 0.92**
Steel works -0.001 0.01 0.97** 0.01 0.003 0.97** 0.01 -0.009 0.97**
Machinery 0.02 -0.01 0.88** 0.05 -0.04 0.88** 0.03 -0.02 0.88**
Aircraft 0.04 -0.05 0.87** 0.09 -0.11 0.88** 0.07 -0.08 0.88**
Shipbuilding 0.000 -0.000 0.83** 0.000 -0.000 0.83** 0.000 -0.000 0.83**
Coal 0.02 -0.02 0.99** 0.06 -0.05 0.99** 0.03 -0.03 0.99**
Utilities 0.009 0.001 0.97** 0.03* -0.02 0.97** 0.02* -0.01 0.97**
Banking 0.03 0.001 0.34** 0.10* -0.05 0.32** 0.04 -0.01 0.34**
Insurance 0.06 0.02 0.54** 0.21 -0.13 0.54** 0.09 0.009 0.55**
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The results in Tables 1.11 and 1.12 are largely consistent with our previous findings for
the S&P 500 and the CRSP aggregate markets using West Texas Intermediate volatility.
The exception is for the 1986:1-2012:12 subsample, for which we find that the volatility of
the U.S. producer price index for crude oil has predictive power for S&P 500 return volatility.
However, the predictability is limited to that time period.
In individual industry sectors, West Texas Intermediate price volatility shows no predic-
tive power for stock return volatility at the industry level. The refiners’ acquisition cost for
imported crude oil has predictive power for the chemicals industry, but this predictability is
shown by the U.S. producer price index for crude oil only for the periods ending in December
2012. Furthermore, in the coal industry, both PPI and RAC show predictive power only for
the periods ending in December 2012. There is also some evidence that volatility of the PPI
can predict stock return volatility in the rubber and construction industries over the period
1986:1-2003:4, but that does not carry over to the other oil series or time periods. For the
other industries, there is no evidence of predictability. We did the same unit root robustness
checks for the individual industry sector analysis as for the aggregate markets, and it does
not change our results.
1.4.2 Instability of forecasting relationships
In this section, we document the instability of the forecasting relationship between aggregate
stock return volatility and oil price volatility. Figure 1.4 shows the estimation results for the
forecasting regression equation (1.10) below (equation (1.8) with lag length equal to one)
using 10-year rolling windows.
rvolmarkett = µ1 + α0rvol
oil
t + α1rvol
oil
t−1 + β1rvol
market
t−1 + εt. (1.10)
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S&P 500: 10-year rolling window estimates for one-month lagged West Texas Intermediate price volatility
coefficient
CRSP: 10-year rolling window estimates for one-month lagged West Texas Intermediate price volatility
coefficient
Figure 1.4: 10-year rolling window estimation results for α1 in equation (1.10) for S&P 500 and CRSP
and West Texas Intermediate over the period 1973:10-2012:12. The dashed lines denote the point estimate
confidence intervals at 5% level.
The results are reported for the S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets and for West
Texas Intermediate from 1973:10 to 2012:12. The panels of Figure 1.4 plot the estimates of
the slope coefficient α1. The dashed lines denote the 95% confidence intervals on the point
estimates.
The considerable instability of the forecasting relationship is illustrated by the variation
of α1 over time. For the S&P 500, the estimate of α1 is close to zero in the subsamples
ending in late 1983, but for the subsamples ending the mid-1980s it is 0.2. In contrast, α1
is much smaller for the subsamples ending in the late 1990s, at around -0.2. It rises again
to around zero in the subsamples ending between 2003 and 2008, and then drops to around
-0.4 in the subsamples ending in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Compared to the S&P 500,
the fluctuations in the estimates of α1 for CRSP returns are smaller. The estimate of α1
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is close to zero in the subsamples ending in late 1983, it increases to 0.2 in the subsamples
ending the mid-1980s, and then is much smaller (around -0.1) for the samples ending in the
mid-1990s and late 1990s. It rises to around zero in the subsamples ending between 2003
and 2008, and then falls to around -0.2 in the subsamples ending in the late 2000s and early
2010s. For both the S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets, α1 is statistically insignificant
in all of the subsamples ending between 1983:9 and 2012:12. This evidence confirms our
previous finding that oil price volatility does not forecast stock return volatility, or at least
not any robust fashion. Not only do the estimated coefficients change, they even change sign
within the sample.
1.4.3 Impulse response function
An alternative way to investigate the short run and long run impacts of oil price volatility
shocks on stock return volatility is to use a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model
that relates U.S. aggregate stock return volatility to oil price volatility. Specifically, we esti-
mate a SVAR model for monthly data, with the impulse response functions identified using
a recursive ordering with oil price volatility first, so that oil price volatility can affect stock
return volatility contemporaneously, but stock return volatility cannot contemporaneously
impact oil price volatility. The corresponding reduced form VAR model is
Zt = α +
k∑
i=1
AiZt−i + εt, (1.11)
where Zt denotes a time series vector consisting of oil price volatility and stock return volatil-
ity, in that order, εt is a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations
and lag length, k, is determined based on AIC.
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1973:10-2012:12 S&P 500 return volatility response CRSP return volatility response
1973:10-2003:4 S&P 500 return volatility response CRSP return volatility response
1986:1-2012:12 S&P 500 return volatility response CRSP return volatility response
1986:1-2003:4 S&P 500 return volatility response CRSP return volatility response
Figure 1.5: Responses of S&P 500 and CRSP return volatility to a one-standard deviation shock to West
Texas Intermediate price volatility.
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The reduced-form VAR residual vector, et, takes the form
et =
 eoil price changes volatility1t
estock returns volatility2t
 =
 a11 0
a21 a22

 εoil price changes volatility shock1t
εother shocks to stock returns volatility2t
 .
(1.12)
Figure 1.5 shows the impulse responses resulting from a one-standard deviation shock to West
Texas Intermediate volatility in different subsamples. Confidence intervals are computed
using bootstrap methods.
The central result in Figure 1.5 is that stock return volatility does not show a response in
the short run to oil price volatility shocks. During the period 1973:10-2012:12, an unexpected
increase in West Texas Intermediate volatility causes a delayed and very small increase in the
S&P 500 and CRSP return volatility, with the effect being more persistent for CRSP return
volatility. The impulse responses follow a similar pattern for the 1973:10-2003:4 subsample.
Over the period 1986:1-2012:12, a one-standard deviation shock to West Texas Intermediate
volatility causes a very small, immediate increase in the S&P 500 return volatility, followed
by a gradual decline. CRSP return volatility shows a very small but sustained response to
that shock. During the period 1986:1-2003:4, aggregate stock markets show similar responses
in a weaker form.
1.4.4 Out-of-sample predictions and forecast evaluation
In the forecasting literature, it is well-known that a model that provides the best in-sample
fitting does not necessarily provide the most accurate forecast (see for example Hendry &
Clements, 2003 and Hendry & Ericsson, 2003). To deal with this, researchers employ out-of-
sample forecast techniques in addition to in-sample estimates. In out-of-sample prediction
the data is divided into two subperiods. The first subperiod is used to fit the model and
is called the estimation subperiod, with the remaining data representing the forecasting
subperiod, and being used to evaluate the performance of each forecasting model. In order
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to assess out-of-sample forecast performance, consider regression equation (1.13) (equation
(1.6) with lag length equal to one) below.
rvolmarkett = µ1 + α1rvol
oil
t−1 + εt, t = 1...T. (1.13)
We first divide the total sample of T observations for rvolmarket and rvoloil into a estima-
tion subsample including the first R observations and a forecasting subsample composed of
the last T − R = S observations. The first out-of-sample forecast of stock return volatility
is given by ˆrvolmarketR+1 = µˆ1 + αˆ1rvoloilR , where µˆ1 and αˆ1 are the OLS estimates of µ1and α1,
respectively, using the first R observations. The next out-of-sample forecast of stock return
volatility is given by ˆrvolmarketR+2 = µˆ1+ αˆ1rvoloilR+1, where µˆ1 and αˆ1 are the OLS estimates of
µ1and α1, respectively, using the period t = 1...R + 1. Proceeding in this manner through
the end of the forecasting subperiod, a series of S out-of-sample forecasts of stock return
volatility can be computed using
{
rvoloilt
}T−1
R
.
In order to figure out whether oil price volatility has significant out-of-sample predictive
power for stock return volatility, we compare equation (1.5) with equation (1.7). The pur-
pose of this comparison is to find out whether oil price volatility contains any information
that can significantly assist with out-of-sample prediction of market return volatility. The
out-of-sample forecast performance of a particular model can be sensitive to how the sample
split is chosen. Since no theoretical guidance exists on how to determine the split point, in
order to see whether the results are robust to the choice of sample split it is important to use
different split points. After estimating equations (1.5) and (1.7) for a given subsample, we
perform the test that Mincer & Zarnowitz (1969) introduced along with two additional pair-
wise comparison tests that are commonly used in the literature to evaluate which equation
provides significantly more accurate forecast.
The idea of Mincer-Zarnowitz test is to test the unbiasedness and efficiency of the forecast.
In order to perform this test, we regress the observed values of stock return volatility on their
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forecasted values over the different subperiods given in equation (1.14) below.
rvolmarkett = θ0 + θ1
ˆrvol
market
t + εt. (1.14)
Then, we jointly test the hull hypothesis of θ0 = 0 and θ1 = 1. An intercept of zero
indicates that the forecast is unbiased. A slope of one indicates that the forecasted market
return volatility efficiently explains its observed values.
The second statistic we report is the out-of-sample mean squared error of each model
over each of the forecasting subperiods. Out-of-sample mean squared error is defined as
MSE =
1
S
T∑
R+1
(
rvolmarkett − ˆrvol
market
t
)2
, (1.15)
where the first R observations compose the estimation subperiod, and the last S observations
are considered as the forecasting subperiod. The model with lower MSE provided better
forecasts over the forecasting period.
It is possible that one model can have a lower MSE over any given subsample even if
both models predict equally well. Indeed, it will always be the case that the two models
will have different MSE statistics in finite samples, even if the two models have the same
expected loss. That is the motivation for the predictive ability test introduced by Diebold
& Mariano (1995). We calculate the loss differential series as
dt = e
2
t,(1.5) − e2t,(1.7), (1.16)
where et,(1.5) and et,(1.7) are the forecast errors of equations (1.5) and (1.7), respectively, in
time t. Under the null hypothesis that the two models have equal expected loss, the mean
of the loss differential series is zero. Diebold & Mariano (1995) and West (1996) show the
conditions under which the distribution of d is normal. The test is implemented by regressing
the loss differential series on a constant and testing if the estimated coefficient is equal to
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zero. As there is no restriction that the residual of that regression will be homoskedastic
or serially uncorrelated, we use Newey-West standard errors. If the estimated coefficient
is positive and significant, then equation (1.7) provides significantly better forecasts than
equation (1.5), while a negative and significant coefficient implies that equation (1.5) provides
more accurate forecasts than equation (1.7).
Table 1.13: Out-of-sample forecast evaluation results to compare the predictive abilities of equations (1.5)
and (1.7). For each time period, we use the first two thirds of the sample as the estimation subperiod and
the last third of the sample as the forecasting subperiod. For the periods 1973:10-2012:12, the estimation
subperiod is 1973:10-1999:11. For the periods 1973:10-2003:4, the estimation subperiod is 1973:10-1993:6.
For the periods 1986:1-2012:12, the estimation subperiod is 1986:1-2003:12. For the periods 1986:1-2003:4,
the estimation subperiod is 1986:1-1997:7. For Mincer-Zarnowitz test, p-values are reported. * and **
indicate significance at 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Realized volatility 1986:1-2012:12
Mincer-Zarnowitz test MSE Diebold-Mariano test
Market Eq. (1.5) Eq. (1.7) Eq. (1.5) Eq. (1.7) t-value
S&P 500 0.017* 0.027* 2.71E-5 2.69E-5 0.94
CRSP 0.053 0.067 2.56E-5 2.55E-5 0.47
Realized volatility 1986:1-2003:4
S&P 500 0.000** 0.000** 2.26E-5 2.27E-5 -1.29
CRSP 0.000** 0.000 ** 2.55E-5 2.56E-5 -1.34
Conditional volatility 1973:10-2012:12
S&P 500 0.805 0.788 4.84E-5 4.84E-5 -0.43
CRSP 0.350 0.474 1.29E-5 1.28E-5 0.70
Conditional volatility 1973:10-2003:4
S&P 500 0.914 0.898 1.29E-5 1.30E-5 -0.47
CRSP 0.582 0.574 2.98E-6 2.98E-6 -0.29
Conditional volatility 1986:1-2012:12
S&P 500 0.915 0.897 1.03E-4 1.03E-4 -1.88
CRSP 0.502 0.593 1.93E-5 1.91E-5 1.32
Conditional volatility 1986:1-2003:4
S&P 500 0.175 0.169 4.00E-5 4.01E-5 -1.29
CRSP 0.079 0.074 6.83E-6 6.86E-6 -1.56
In Table 1.13 we report the out-of-sample forecast evaluation results. The Mincer-
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Zarnowitz test results indicate that there is no difference between equation (1.5) and equa-
tion (1.7) in terms of predictive ability. Both regressions provide equally accurate out-of-
sample forecasts for the CRSP aggregate stock return realized volatility series over the period
1986:12-2012:12 and for both S&P 500 and CRSP aggregate markets for conditional return
volatility series over all of the investigated time periods. The MSE comparisons reveal that
both equations (1.5) and (1.7) forecast stock return volatility with approximately the same
level of accuracy. The Diebold-Mariano test results provide no evidence against the null
hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy. The findings show that West Texas Intermediate
volatility does not have significant out-of-sample predictive power for S&P 500 and CRSP
return volatility. These out-of-sample prediction results are in line with our previous findings.
We checked the robustness of these results to changes in the size of the estimation and
forecasting subperiods. The results (not reported) were consistent with the reported out-of-
sample findings and indicate that equation (1.5) forecasts stock return volatility as accurately
as equation (1.7), and in some periods even provides better predictions.
1.5 Conclusions
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the relationship between stock return volatil-
ity and oil price volatility. We studied volatility of aggregate stock markets as well as individ-
ual industry sectors. The most important motivation for our analysis is that of predictability:
if stock returns can be predicted by lagged oil price changes, as some papers in the literature
have found, it may be the case that stock return volatility is predictable using lagged oil
price volatility. In addition, we looked at how the relationship has changed through time.
We did a variety of robustness checks to confirm that our findings are not an artifact of a
particular choice of model specification.
The in-sample prediction results indicate that the stock return volatility is mainly ex-
plained by its own past and contemporaneous oil price volatility. We find little evidence to
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support the view that oil price volatility leads aggregate stock return volatility. In addition,
rolling window estimation results find substantial instability of the forecasting relationship
through time. There are even changes in the sign of the relationship.
The results are also consistent with the results obtained from a GARCH(1,1)-X which
allows for including the lagged variance of oil price changes as an exogenous regressor in
the stock returns variance equation. For individual industries, we find some evidence of
predictability for four of fifteen sectors including chemicals, coal, rubber and construction
industries, but that finding is only robust and stable for the chemicals industry.
We then employed two alternative methodologies. First, estimated impulse response
functions indicate that shocks to oil price volatility have no systematic relationship with
future movements in stock return volatility. Second, an out-of-sample forecast analysis sup-
port the in-sample findings. Overall, we conclude that there is little evidence that oil price
volatility can be used to predict stock return volatility.
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Chapter 2
Non-Exclusionary Input Prices1
2.1 Introduction
In traditional infrastructure industries, including telecommunications, electric power and
natural gas, it is common for an upstream monopolist to supply an input that is essential
for downstream production. For example, in telecommunications markets, the competition
may require that rivals be able to access to the local distribution network for the origination
and termination of wireless/wireline calls. In electric power and natural gas industries, the
essential input takes the form of access to the transmission and distribution networks of
regional power and gas companies.
In the recent literature in regulatory economics, the principal focus is on essential input
(access) pricing to protect against the foreclosure of efficient downstream competition. In the
case of foreclosure, a vertically-integrated provider (VIP) that is a monopoly supplier of an
essential input reduces the profit margins of its rivals in the downstream market through a
price squeeze and thereby drives them from the market (see for example Perry, 1989; Kahn
& Taylor, 1994; and Armstrong, 2002, among others). The exclusionary effect of a price
squeeze derives from an upstream input price that is too high relative to the downstream
retail price.
1This chapter is the extended version of a published paper (see Nadimi & Weisman, 2014).
37
Hausman & Tardiff (1995) show that the price of the VIP’s retail service should be
no lower than the sum of the incremental cost of providing the retail service and the net
contribution foregone (opportunity cost) in selling the retail service rather than the access
service to competitors. Weisman (2002) studies the foreclosure problem when the price of
the “essential input” is determined by a regulator, and explores how high the VIP’s retail
price should be in order to prevent an anticompetitive retail price squeeze.
A complementary literature addresses a different form of market exclusion, and studies
the incentives of a VIP with monopoly in input market to engage in non-price discrimination
or sabotage against its rivals (see for example Salop & Scheffman, 1983; Krattenmaker &
Salop, 1986; Sibley & Weisman, 1998a; Sibley & Weisman, 1998b; and Beard et al., 2001,
among others). In the case of sabotage, the VIP degrades the quality of access to downstream
competitors and thereby raises the costs of its rivals. The incentive for sabotage derives from
an upstream input price that is too low relative to the downstream retail price. To understand
the intuition underlying this statement, recognize that when the input price is sufficiently
remunerative, the VIP would not rationally choose to restrict the demand for the input by
raising its rival’s costs.
Mandy (2000) finds that sabotage depends on three parameters including the access
charge markup, the extent of downstream competition, and the relative inefficiency of the
VIP in the downstream market. He shows that some combination of these parameters would
lead to sabotage, while some others would not. Mandy & Sappington (2007) find that while
some forms of sabotage may raise the operating cost of the rivals (e.g., engaging in protracted
litigation and imposing standards that are costly for rivals to adopt), other forms of sabotage
may primarily decrease the demand for rivals’ products (e.g., degrading the relative quality
of access provided to rivals and limiting their ability to test new products and deliver them
to customers). They show that the VIP’s incentives to sabotage the activities of downstream
rivals can be influenced by both the type of sabotage (cost-increasing or demand-reducing)
and the nature of downstream competition.
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We have three important motivations for our paper. The first motivation is to establish
the connection between these two strands of the literature by exploring the relationship
between input prices and market exclusion when the products are differentiated. The second
motivation is to examine the role of product differentiation in circumscribing the range of non-
exclusionary input prices end explore how this safe harbor range changes as products become
increasingly homogeneous. The third motivation concerns the importance of the problem
for the antitrust or regulatory authority. While the regulators have recognized the need to
be proactive in protecting against a price squeeze through price-floor constraints, to date
they have not considered the important role of price-ceiling constraints to prevent sabotage.
The antitrust or regulatory authority may choose to simultaneously employ the well-known
price-floor constraint and a complementary price-ceiling constraint to safeguard against both
forms of market exclusion. Hence, the focus of this paper is not to perform a welfare analysis
per se, but rather to delineate regulatory pricing rules that protect against market exclusion
and the integrity of the competitive process in relation to individual competitors.
The principal findings of this analysis are as follows. First, an input price that is “too high”
can give rise to inefficient foreclosure, whereas an input price that is “too low” can induce
the VIP to engage in sabotage or non-price discrimination. Second, there is a range of non-
exclusionary input prices that simultaneously protects against both inefficient foreclosure and
sabotage. This range of non-exclusionary input prices is circumscribed by the input prices
generated on the basis of upper-bound and lower-bound displacement ratios. Third, the
admissible range of the ratio of downstream to upstream “price-cost” margins is increasing in
the degree of product differentiation and reduces to a single ratio in the limit as the products
become perfectly homogeneous.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the notation
and definitions. In Section 2.3 we develop the formal model and present the main findings.
Section 2.4 provides a brief summary and concluding remarks. The proofs of all formal
results are contained in the Appendix A.
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2.2 Notation and Definitions
There is a single VIP that serves as a monopolist in the upstream input market and a
single independent downstream provider. The downstream demand functions for the VIP
and the independent provider are given by QV (P V , P I) and QI(P I , P V ), where P i, i = V
and I denote the respective downstream prices for the VIP and the independent rival. The
downstream outputs of the VIP and the independent downstream provider are imperfect
substitutes so that QiP j > 0 for i, j = V and I, i 6= j, where the subscripts denote partial
derivatives. There are no income effects.
The price and constant marginal cost of the input are denoted by w and c, respectively.
The production technology is fixed-coefficient: each unit of downstream output requires one
unit of the VIP-supplied input and one unit of a complementary input. The cost of each unit
of the complementary input is denoted by si, i = V and I. Let d > 0 denote the increment by
which the VIP raises the per-unit cost of its rival through non-price discrimination. Finally,
let C(d) denote the cost of non-price discrimination for the VIP, with C(0) = 0, C ′(0) = 0,
C ′(d) > 0, and C ′′(d) > 0 ∀d > 0.
The profit functions for the VIP and the independent rival, which are assumed to satisfy
standard regularity conditions that ensure a unique optimum, are given, respectively, by
ΠV = QI(P I , P V )(w − c) +QV (P V , P I)(P V − c− sV )− C(d) (2.1)
and
ΠI = QI(P I , P V )(P I − w − sI − d). (2.2)
Assumption 2.1.
∣∣∣∣∂Qi∂P i
∣∣∣∣ > ∂Qi∂P j , i, j = V and I, i 6= j.
Assumption 2.1 imposes the standard regularity condition that own-price effects dominate
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cross-price effects (Vives, 1999, p. 157).
Definition 2.1. (Displacement ratio):
The displacement ratio is the absolute value of the change in the output of the independent
rival associated with a one-unit increase in the output of the VIP (Armstrong et al., 1996).
In the differentiated products setting under examination, there are two downstream prices
and therefore two displacement ratios.
Lemma 2.1. The upper-bound displacement ratio is given by
σu =
∣∣∣∣∣∂Q
I
∂P I/
∂QV
∂P I
∣∣∣∣∣ . (2.3)
Lemma 2.2. The lower-bound displacement ratios given by
σl =
∣∣∣∣∣
 ∂QI
∂P V
+
∂QI
∂P I
∂P I
∂P V
/∂QV
∂P V
∣∣∣∣∣ . (2.4)
Definition 2.2. (Product homogeneity):
The degree of product homogeneity is given by θ =
σl
σu
∈ (0, 1).
Assumption 2.2. The displacement ratios, σi, i = l and u, are constants.
The VIP is generally required by the antitrust or regulatory authority to satisfy a price
floor (P-F) constraint. This constraint requires that the downstream price for the VIP be no
lower than the incremental cost of providing downstream output plus the net contribution
foregone (opportunity cost) in not providing the upstream input. The opportunity cost
in this setting is computed on the basis of σl because it is the change in the VIP’s price
41
(P V ) rather than the rival’s price (P I) that induces the change in the VIP’s output. This
constraint requires that the lower-bound displacement ratio be no greater than the ratio of
downstream to upstream “price-cost” margins (r).
Definition 2.3. (P-F constraint): 2
P V ≥ c+ sV + σl(w − c)⇔ w ≤ c+ σ−1l (P V − c− sV )⇔ r =
P V − c− sV
w − c ≥ σl. (2.5)
An input price that is too low relative to the output price can give rise to non-price
discrimination and underscores the need for a complementary, price-ceiling (P-C) constraint.
This constraint requires that the upper-bound displacement ratio be no less than the ratio
of downstream to upstream “price-cost” margins.
Definition 2.4. (P-C constraint):
P V ≤ c+ sV + σu(w − c)⇔ w ≥ c+ σ−1u (P V − c− sV )⇔ r =
P V − c− sV
w − c ≤ σu. (2.6)
The upper-bound displacement ratio (σu) enters the analysis here because it is the change
in the rival’s price (P I) , triggered by the non-price discrimination and the resultant increase
in its costs, that diverts demand from the rival to the VIP.
A binding P-C constraint defines the lower bound input price, w, and a binding P-F
constraint defines the upper bound input price, w.
Definition 2.5. (Lower/upper-bound input prices and margin ratios):
a) The lower-bound input price (upper-bound margin ratio) is given by
w(σ−1u ) = c+ σ
−1
u (P
V − c− sV )⇔ r = P
V − c− sV
w − c = σu. (2.7)
2The input price that results when this last relation holds with equality is a form of the efficient component
pricing rule or ECPR.
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b) The upper-bound input price (lower-bound margin ratio) is given by
w(σ−1l )
= c+ σ−1l (P
V − c− sV )⇔ r = P
V − c− sV
w − c = σl. (2.8)
2.3 Formal model
The VIP and the independent rival compete in a three-stage, Bertrand-Nash game.3 In the
first stage, the regulator chooses the input pricing rule, w = c + k(P V − c − sV ), where k
is the inverse displacement ratio. In the second stage, the VIP and the independent rival
simultaneously choose profit-maximizing prices. In the third stage, the VIP chooses the
profit-maximizing level of non-price discrimination (d).
The necessary first-order conditions for the second stage of the game are given by
∂ΠV
∂P V
=
∂QI
∂P V
(w − c) + ∂w
∂P V
QI(P I , P V ) +
∂QV
∂P V
(P V − c− sV ) +QV (P V , P I) = 0 (2.9)
and
∂ΠI
∂P I
=
∂QI
∂P I
(P I − w − sI − d) +QI(P I , P V ) = 0. (2.10)
Lemma 2.3. At the Nash equilibrium defined by (2.9) and (2.10),
∂P I
∗
∂d
> 0 and
∂P V
∗
∂d
> 0
.
The first proposition establishes that the VIP does not engage in non-price discrimination
for any input price that is greater than or equal to the lower-bound input price.
Proposition 2.1. At the Nash equilibrium, d∗ = 0 ∀k ≥ σ−1u ⇒ ∀w ≥ w.
The second proposition establishes that the VIP engages in non-price discrimination for
any input price that is strictly less than the lower-bound input price.
3Weisman (2014) examines a similar problem in which the VIP is the leader and the rival is the follower.
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Proposition 2.2. At the Nash equilibrium, d∗ > 0 ∀k < σ−1u ⇒ ∀w < w.
The third proposition establishes that the VIP engages in neither type of market exclusion
for input prices that satisfy both the P-F and P-C constraints.
Proposition 2.3. The VIP does not engage in market exclusion ∀k ∈ [σ−1u , σ−1l ] ⇒ ∀w ∈
[w,w].
As shown in Figure 2.1, market exclusion takes the form of inefficient foreclosure when
w > w and sabotage when w < w. The range of non-exclusionary input prices is therefore
defined by w ∈ [w,w].
Figure 2.1: Range of non-exclusionary input prices.
The fourth proposition reveals that the range of admissible margin ratios reduces to a
single ratio in the limit as the degree of product differentiation vanishes.
Proposition 2.4. In the limit as θ → 1, r → r.
Corollary 2.1. In the limit as θ → 1, the non-exclusionary margin ratio is unique and
satisfies the “equal-margin rule.”
The “equal-margin rule” requires that the input price be set so as maintain equality
between the VIP’s retail and wholesale margins, or P V − c− sV = w − c.
To facilitate a closed-form solution, we specify a linear demand system of the form
QV (P V , P I) = aV − bV P V + gV P I (2.11)
and
QI(P I , P V ) = aI − bIP I + gIP V , (2.12)
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where aV , aI , bV , bI , gV , gI > 0.
Proposition 2.5. The Nash equilibrium prices are given by
P V (k) = −2a
V +
(
c+ d+ sI − k(sV + c)) (gV − kbI)
k(3gI + gV − kbI)− 4bV + g
IgV
bI
−
2(c+ sV )(bV − kgI) + aI(k + g
V
bI
)
k(3gI + gV − kbI)− 4bV + g
IgV
bI
(2.13)
and
P I(k) = −(b
V − kgI) ((gI(c+ sV )− bI(ck + ksV − 2sI) + 2bI(c+ d) + aI)
gIgV − bI (4bV + k2bI − k(3gI + gV ))
− kb
I(kaI + aV ) + aV gI + aIbV
gIgV − bI (4bV + k2bI − k(3gI + gV )) .
(2.14)
Proposition 2.6. The VIP’s Nash equilibrium profit function is given by
ΠV (k) =
aI(gV + kbI) + bI(c+ d+ sI)(gV − kbI) + 2aV bI
+(c+ sV )
(
gIgV + bI(kgI − 2bV ))

2
(bV − kgI)
(gIgV − bI (4bV + k2bI − k(3gI + gV )))2 − C(d). (2.15)
The following example illustrates the manner in which the range of non-exclusionary
input prices varies with the degree of product differentiation.
Example 2.1. The demand functions for the VIP and the independent rival are linear as
specified in (2.11) and (2.12) with aV = aI = 20, bV = bI = 2, and gV = gI = g ∈ (0, 2).
Also, sV = sI = c = 1. The numerical simulations are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.4
The simulation results in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 confirm the theoretical findings and provide
4Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 along with (2.11), (2.12) and (A.20) imply that σu =
bI
gV
and σl =
2bI
(√
(gI)2 + 8bIbV − gI
)−1
.
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additional insights. First, P V is increasing in θ, ceteris paribus. As the degree of product
homogeneity increases, the VIP’s upstream and downstream outputs become closer substi-
tutes for one another which the VIP leverages by raising its retail price. Second, consistent
with Proposition 2.4, the range of upper/lower-bound margin ratios (r− r) approaches zero
as θ approaches unity as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Third, consistent with Corollary 2.1, in
the limit as θ → 1, P V − c− sV = w− c, which is the equal margin rule. Fourth, the upper-
bound input price, w(σ−1u ), enables the rival to earn positive profits when the services of the
VIP and the rival are sufficiently differentiated (i.e., lower values of θ) but the rival’s profits
approach zero as the services become increasingly homogeneous. The more homogeneous
are the product offerings, the greater the ability of the VIP to appropriate the independent
rival’s profits through the choice of input price.5 Finally, the VIP’s profits are increasing in
θ across both inverse displacement ratios.
Figure 2.2: Changes in lower-bound (in red) and upper-bound (in blue) margin ratios.
5Note that the VIP’s market power is increasing the degree of product homogeneity in this setting.
46
Table 2.1: Numerical simulation results.
g σ−1u σ
−1
l θ w(σ−1u ) w(σ−1l )
PV
(σ−1u )
PV
(σ−1l )
P I
(σ−1u )
P I
(σ−1l )
0.5 0.25 1.29 0.19 2.42 10.03 7.67 8.98 7.67 11.64
1.0 0.50 1.19 0.42 5.50 15.13 11.00 13.91 11.00 16.54
1.2 0.60 1.15 0.52 7.90 18.92 13.50 17.64 13.50 20.25
1.4 0.70 1.11 0.63 11.97 25.21 17.67 23.87 17.67 26.46
1.6 0.80 1.07 0.75 20.20 37.75 26.00 36.36 26.00 38.92
1.8 0.90 1.03 0.87 45.10 75.29 51.00 73.84 51.00 76.38
1.9 0.95 1.02 0.93 95.05 150.31 101.00 148.84 101.00 151.36
1.94 0.97 1.01 0.96 161.70 250.32 167.67 248.84 167.67 251.35
Table 2.2: Numerical simulation results.
g σ−1u σ
−1
l θ Π
V
(σ−1u )
ΠV
(σ−1l )
ΠI
(σ−1u )
ΠI
(σ−1l )
r r
0.5 0.25 1.29 0.19 60.21 65.83 36.13 0.73 4.00 0.77
1.0 0.50 1.19 0.42 121.50 115.51 40.50 0.34 2.00 0.84
1.2 0.60 1.15 0.52 169.28 152.98 42.32 0.22 1.67 0.87
1.4 0.70 1.11 0.63 250.35 215.50 44.18 0.12 1.43 0.90
1.6 0.80 1.07 0.75 414.72 340.56 46.08 0.06 1.25 0.93
1.8 0.90 1.03 0.87 912.38 715.67 48.02 0.01 1.11 0.97
1.9 0.95 1.02 0.93 1911.20 1465.75 49.01 0.003 1.05 0.98
1.94 0.97 1.01 0.96 3244.05 2465.78 49.40 0.001 1.03 0.99
2.4 Conclusions
Market exclusion is a concern when input prices are “too high” because it can result in inef-
ficient foreclosure as well as when input prices are “too low” because it can create incentives
for sabotage. Upper/lower-bound displacement ratios are used to generate a range of non-
exclusionary input prices. The admissible range of the ratio of downstream to upstream
margins is increasing in the degree of product differentiation and reduces to a single ratio
in the limit as the products become perfectly homogeneous. An important implication for
competition policy is that both price-floor and price-ceiling constraints may be necessary to
protect against market exclusion in certain settings.
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Chapter 3
Non-Exclusionary Input Prices under
Quantity Competition
3.1 Introduction
In regulated industries, including telecommunications, electric power, natural gas and rail-
roads, it is common that a vertically integrated provider (VIP) is a monopoly supplier of an
essential input for the rival to produce downstream output. Market exclusion in the form of
inefficient foreclosure and sabotage can arise when input prices are, respectively, “too high”
and “too low” relative to the downstream price. The first branch of the literature on market
exclusion focuses on how to price the essential input so as not to foreclose efficient down-
stream competition (see for example Hausman & Tardiff, 1995 and Weisman, 2002, among
others). The second branch of the literature on market exclusion explores the conditions
under which the VIP does not have incentives to engage in sabotage or non-price discrimina-
tion against its rivals (see for example Sibley & Weisman, 1998a; Sibley & Weisman, 1998b;
and Mandy & Sappington, 2007, among others).
While a large body of work has been devoted to study each of these two types of market
exclusion, few researchers have explored the formal connection between these two branches
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of the literature. Nadimi & Weisman (2014) show how complementary price-floor and price-
ceiling constraints can simultaneously safeguard against both forms of market exclusion in a
Bertrand competition framework with a VIP that is a monopolist in the input (downstream)
market. Weisman (2014) studies the role of complementary price-floor and price-ceiling
constraints to derive a range of safe harbor input prices in a price-competition framework in
which the VIP is the leader and the rival is the follower.
We have two primary objectives for this analysis. The first objective is to examine the
role of product differentiation in circumscribing the range of non-exclusionary input prices
in a Stackelberg quantity-competition framework in order to understand how our previous
findings change under different competition settings. Second, it is reasonable to believe that
the range of non-exclusionary input prices varies with the form of competition that prevails
in the industry. As a result, it is important for government regulators to understand the
specific model of competition that applies for the particular industry that they regulate so
that the findings of the analysis can be applied in a credible and efficient manner.
The principal findings of this paper are fourfold. First, input prices that are too high
can give rise to inefficient market foreclosure and input prices that are too low can create
incentives for non-price discrimination. Second, there is a range of non-exclusionary input
prices that simultaneously protects against both inefficient foreclosure and sabotage. Third,
the safe harbor range of downstream to upstream “price-cost” margin ratios is decreasing in
the degree of product homogeneity and approaches a single ratio in the limit as the products
become perfectly homogeneous. This single margin ratio preserves equality between the
VIP’s wholesale and retail “price-cost” margins. Fourth, a key finding for competition policy
is that the bounds of non-exclusionary input prices are markedly wider under Bertrand-
Nash competition than they are under Stackelberg competition. Hence, it is critical that the
antitrust and regulatory authorities understand the nature of the industry competition so
that rules governing permissible conduct are properly calibrated to yield efficient outcomes.
The remainder of the chapter is outlined as follows. The notation and definitions are
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introduced in section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we develop the formal model and main findings.
Section 3.4 describes the policy applications of our paper in the telecommunications industry.
Section 3.5 concludes. The proofs of all formal results are contained in the Appendix B.
3.2 Notation and Definitions
There is a single VIP with a monopoly in the upstream input market and a single inde-
pendent downstream provider. For the VIP and the independent provider, the downstream
inverse demand functions are given by P V (QV , QI) and P I(QI , QV ), where Qi, i = V and
I denote the downstream outputs for the VIP and the independent rival, respectively. The
downstream products supplied by the VIP and the independent downstream provider are
imperfect substitutes so that P iQi < P
i
Qj < 0 for i, j = V and I, i 6= j, where the subscripts
denote partial derivatives. The price and constant marginal cost of the input supplied by
the VIP are denoted by w and c, respectively. The production technology is fixed-coefficient
that implies the production of each unit of downstream output requires one unit of the VIP-
supplied input and one unit of a complementary input. Each unit of the complementary
input costs si, i = V and I. Let d > 0 denote the increment by which the VIP raises
the per-unit cost of its rival through sabotage. Finally, let C(d) denote the VIP’s cost of
sabotage, with C(0) = 0, C ′(0) = 0, C ′(d) > 0, and C ′′(d) > 0 ∀d > 0.
The profit functions for the VIP and the independent rival satisfy standard regularity
conditions that ensure a unique optimum and are given, respectively, by
ΠV = QI(w − c) +QV (P V − c− sV )− C(d) (3.1)
and
ΠI = QI(P I − w − sI − d). (3.2)
Definition 3.1. (Displacement ratio):
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The displacement ratio (σ) is the absolute value of the change in the independent rival’
output associated with a one-unit increase in the VIP’s output (Armstrong et al., 1996).
3.3 Formal model
The VIP is assumed to be the leader and the rival is the follower in a Stackelberg setting that
permits only non-discriminatory, uniform prices. A formal statement of the VIP’s problem
[V-P] is given by
Maximum
{QV ,QI ,d}
ΠV = QI(w − c) +QV (P V − c− sV )− C(d)
subject to : QI ∈ argmax
QI
ΠI = QI(P I − w − sI − d),
(3.3)
where P V ≥ 0, P I ≥ 0, d ≥ 0.
The incentive compatibility constraint in [V-P] employs the first-order approach to model
the rival’s profit-maximizing choice of QI . Thus,
∂ΠI
∂QI
=
(
P I − w − sI − d)+QI (∂P I
∂QI
− ∂w
∂P V
∂P V
∂QI
)
= 0. (3.4)
The Lagrangian for this problem is given by
L = QI(w − c) +QV (P V − c− sV )− C(d)
+λ
[(
P I − w − sI − d)+QI (∂P I
∂QI
− ∂w
∂P V
∂P V
∂QI
)]
,
(3.5)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
An input price that is too low relative to the output price can give rise to market exclusion
in the form of non-price discrimination and underscores the need for a price-ceiling (P-C)
constraint. This constraint requires that the downstream price for the VIP be no greater
than the incremental cost of providing downstream output plus the net contribution foregone
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(opportunity cost) in not providing the upstream input.
Definition 3.2. (P-C constraint):
P V ≤ c+ sV + σu(w − c)⇔ w ≥ c+ σ−1u (P V − c− sV )⇔ r =
P V − c− sV
w − c ≤ σu. (3.6)
This constraint requires that the upper-bound displacement ratio (σu) be greater than or
equal to the ratio of downstream to upstream “price-cost” margins (r).
The VIP is generally required by the antitrust or regulatory authority to satisfy a price-
floor (P-F) constraint that ensures its retail price is no lower than the sum of the direct
cost and the opportunity cost of providing the downstream output. The opportunity cost is
measured in terms of the net revenue from input sales foregone when the VIP supplies one
additional unit of output.
Definition 3.3. (P-F constraint):
P V ≥ c+ sV + σl(w − c)⇔ w ≤ c+ σ−1l (P V − c− sV )⇔ r =
P V − c− sV
w − c ≥ σl. (3.7)
The lower-bound displacement ratio (σl) is derived from the rival’s reaction function because
it measures the output of the rival that is displaced when the VIP supplies an additional unit
of output. This constraint requires that the lower-bound displacement ratio be less than or
equal to the ratio of downstream to upstream “price-cost” margins.
As formalized in the following definition, binding P-C and P-F constraints define the
lower bound input price (w) and the upper bound input price (w), respectively.
Definition 3.4. (Lower/upper-bound input prices and margin ratios):
a) The lower-bound input price and upper-bound margin ratio are given by
w(σ−1u ) = c+ σ
−1
u (P
V − c− sV )⇔ r = P
V − c− sV
w − c = σu. (3.8)
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b) The upper-bound input price and lower-bound margin ratio are given by
w(σ−1l )
= c+ σ−1l (P
V − c− sV )⇔ r = P
V − c− sV
w − c = σl. (3.9)
In the analysis that follows, we specify the input price as w = c+ k(P V − c− sV ), where
k is the relevant inverse displacement ratio.
Lemma 3.1. The upper-bound displacement ratio is
σu =
∣∣∣∣ ∂QI∂QV
∣∣∣∣ = ∂P V∂QV /∂P V∂QI . (3.10)
Lemma 3.2. The lower-bound displacement ratio is
σl =
∣∣∣∣ ∂QI∂QV
∣∣∣∣ = 2
∣∣∣∣∂P V∂QV +QI ∂2P V∂QI∂QV
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂P I
∂QV
− 2∂P
V
∂QI
−QI
(
∂2P V
(∂QI)2
− ∂
2P I
∂QI∂QV
)
−

8
∂P I
∂QI
∂P V
∂QV
− 4 ∂P
I
∂QV
∂P V
∂QI
+ (
∂P I
∂QV
)2 + 4(
∂P V
∂QI
)2 + (QI
∂2P V
∂QI∂QV
)2+
(QI
∂2P V
(∂QI)2
)2 + 2QI

∂P I
∂QV
∂2P I
∂QI∂QV
− ∂P
I
∂QV
∂2P V
(∂QI)2
+2
∂P V
∂QV
∂2P I
(∂QI)2
− 2∂P
V
∂QI
∂2P I
∂QI∂QV
+4
∂P I
∂QI
∂2P V
∂QI∂QV
+ 2
∂P V
∂QI
∂2P V
(∂QI)2
−
QI
(
∂2P I
∂QI∂QV
∂2P V
(∂QI)2
− 2 ∂
2P I
(∂QI)2
∂2P V
∂QI∂QV
)


1/2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
(3.11)
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Definition 3.5. (Product homogeneity):
The degree of product homogeneity is given by θ =
σl
σu
∈ (0, 1).
Assumption 3.1. The displacement ratios, σi, i = l and u, are constants.
The first proposition establishes that the VIP does not engage in non-price discrimination
for any input price that satisfies the P-C constraint. This implies that the VIP does not
engage in non-price discrimination for any margin ratio that is no greater than the upper-
bound margin ratio.
Proposition 3.1. At the solution to [V-P], d∗ = 0 ∀k ≥ σ−1u ⇒ ∀w ≥ w ⇒ ∀r ≤ r.
The second proposition establishes that the VIP engages in non-price discrimination
or sabotage when the input price is strictly less than the lower-bound input price, and
consequently when the margin ratio is strictly greater than the upper-bound margin ratio.
Proposition 3.2. At the solution to [V-P], d∗ > 0 ∀k < σ−1u ⇒ ∀w < w ⇒ ∀r > r.
The third proposition establishes that the VIP does not engage in either type of market
exclusion for any input price (margin ratio) that satisfies both the P-F and P-C constraints.
Proposition 3.3. The VIP does not engage in market exclusion ∀k ∈ [σ−1u , σ−1l ] ⇒ ∀w ∈
[w,w]⇒ ∀r ∈ [r, r].
Figure 3.1 shows that market exclusion takes the form of inefficient foreclosure and sab-
otage when w > w ⇒ r < r and when w < w ⇒ r > r, respectively. Hence, the admissible
range of non-exclusionary input prices and margin ratios is defined by w ∈ [w,w]⇒ r ∈ [r, r].
Figure 3.1: Range of non-exclusionary input prices (margin ratios).
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The following proposition shows that the safe harbor range of margin ratios reduces to a
single ratio in the limit as the degree of product homogeneity approaches unity (i.e., perfectly
homogeneous).
Proposition 3.4. In the limit as products become perfectly homogeneous (θ → 1), r → r.
Corollary 3.1. In the limit as products become perfectly homogeneous (θ → 1), the non-
exclusionary margin ratio is unique and satisfies the “equal-margin rule.”
The “equal-margin rule” satisfies P V − c− sV = w − c.
Example 3.1. The inverse demand functions for the VIP and the independent rival are
specified as P V/I(QV/I , QI/V ) = 20− 2QV/I − 2gQI/V , where g ∈ (0, 1). Further, sV = sI =
c = 1. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 presents the numerical simulations.1
The numerical simulations shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 confirm the theoretical findings
and provide additional insights. First, consistent with Proposition 3.4, the range of non-
exclusionary margin ratios (r− r) approaches zero as θ approaches unity. Second, consistent
with Corollary 3.1, in the limit as θ → 1, P V −c−sV = w−c, which is the equal margin rule.
Third, as the degree of product homogeneity increases, each additional unit of the rival’s
output displaces a larger amount of the VIP output. Hence, w increases with the degree of
product homogeneity to compensate the VIP for this displaced output.2 Fourth, the rival
earns positive profits when the services of the VIP and the rival are sufficiently differentiated,
but the rival’s profits approach zero as the services become increasingly homogeneous at the
upper-bound input price, w. The more homogeneous are the product offerings, the greater
the ability of the VIP to appropriate the rival’s profits through the input price. Fifth,
recognize that the monopoly outcome in this example is P V = 11, QV = 4.5 and ΠV = 40.5.
The VIP sets the lower-bound input price, w, to induce the rival follower to set P I
(σ−1u )
= 11,
1Appealing to Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, it is readily shown for this example thatσ−1u = g and σ
−1
l =∣∣∣∣∣2g −
√
32 + 4g2
−4
∣∣∣∣∣. In the limit, as θ → 1, g → 1, which implies σ−1u → 1 and σ−1l → 1.
2Recall that w is defined as that input price at which the VIP is indifferent between selling an additional
unit of downstream output and selling an additional unit of the input to its rival.
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Table 3.1: Numerical simulation results.
g σ−1u σ
−1
l θ w(σ−1u ) P
V
(σ−1u )
P I
(σ−1u )
QV
(σ−1u )
QI
(σ−1u )
ΠV
(σ−1u )
ΠI
(σ−1u )
r
0.25 0.25 1.29 0.19 3.25 11.00 11.00 3.60 3.60 40.50 24.30 4.00
0.50 0.50 1.19 0.42 5.50 11.00 11.00 3.00 3.00 40.50 13.50 2.00
0.60 0.60 1.15 0.52 6.40 11.00 11.00 2.81 2.81 40.50 10.13 1.67
0.70 0.70 1.11 0.63 7.30 11.00 11.00 2.65 2.65 40.50 7.15 1.43
0.80 0.80 1.07 0.75 8.20 11.00 11.00 2.50 2.50 40.50 4.50 1.25
0.90 0.90 1.03 0.87 9.10 11.00 11.00 2.37 2.37 40.50 2.13 1.11
0.95 0.95 1.02 0.93 9.55 11.00 11.00 2.31 2.31 40.50 1.04 1.05
0.97 0.97 1.01 0.96 9.73 11.00 11.00 2.28 2.28 40.50 0.62 1.03
Table 3.2: Numerical simulation results.
g σ−1u σ
−1
l θ w(σ−1l )
PV
(σ−1l )
P I
(σ−1l )
QV
(σ−1l )
QI
(σ−1l )
ΠV
(σ−1l )
ΠI
(σ−1l )
r
0.25 0.25 1.29 0.19 11.33 9.98 14.49 4.61 1.60 53.32 3.47 0.77
0.50 0.50 1.19 0.42 10.84 10.29 13.00 4.14 1.43 48.39 1.66 0.84
0.60 0.60 1.15 0.52 10.66 10.43 12.51 3.97 1.37 46.62 1.17 0.87
0.70 0.70 1.11 0.63 10.48 10.57 12.07 3.81 1.30 44.94 0.76 0.90
0.80 0.80 1.07 0.75 10.31 10.71 11.67 3.65 1.24 43.37 0.44 0.93
0.90 0.90 1.03 0.87 10.15 10.85 11.32 3.51 1.18 41.89 0.19 0.97
0.95 0.95 1.02 0.93 10.08 10.93 11.15 3.44 1.15 41.19 0.09 0.98
0.97 0.97 1.01 0.96 10.05 10.96 11.09 3.41 1.14 40.91 0.05 0.99
which, in turn, sustains monopoly profits, the sum of upstream and downstream profits, for
the VIP for all value of θ. Sixth, as θ → 1, ΠV
(σ−1l )
→ 40.5, the monopoly level of profits. To
understand this result, recognize that for low values of θ, which corresponds to high levels of
product differentiation, the VIP earns in excess of monopoly profits by using the input price
to extract a share of the rival’s profits from a segment of the market that only marginally
cannibalizes the VIP’s profits. Conversely, as θ grows large, the degree of cannibalization
increases, limiting the VIP’s profits and retail price to monopoly levels.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the bounds of the non-exclusionary input prices for Bertrand-Nash
competition and Stackelberg competition. A key observation is that the bounds of the non-
exclusionary input prices are markedly greater under Bertrand-Nash competition. This ob-
servation underscores the importance of identifying the correct market structure. Specifically,
if the regulator believes that competition is Bertrand-Nash when it is actually Stackelberg
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there is a greater likelihood of unwittingly permitting exclusionary behavior. In practice,
the regulator may not have perfect information regarding the nature of competition in the
industry. Hence, in the presence of imperfect information, the regulator may be presented
with the prospect of making a Type I error3 or Type II error4 with regard to calibrating
the permissible bounds on input prices. The objective for the regulator would then be one
of calibrating the allowable range of input prices so as to minimize the social cost of “being
wrong.” This is a question that lies beyond the extant analysis, but is an interesting topic
for future research.
Figure 3.2: Upper-bound (blue) and lower-bound (red) input prices under Bertrand- Nash (dashed lines)
competition and Stackelberg (solid lines) competition.
3.4 Application: Telecommunications
Following the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, allegations of both forms of ex-
clusionary behavior (foreclosure and non-price discrimination) were made against incumbent
3Mistakenly prohibiting procompetitive activities.
4Mistakenly permitting anticompetitive activities.
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telecommunications providers. As an example for foreclosure, in the Linkline case, the in-
cumbent VIP, AT&T, was accused of unlawfully squeezing its rivals’ profit margins through
a combination of high input (wholesale) prices and low retail prices in the market for digital
subscriber-line (DSL). This squeezed the profits of the incumbent’s rivals and purportedly
caused some of them to exit the market (Squeo, 2004). As the Supreme Court observed:
“The plaintiffs in this case, respondents here, allege that a competitor subjected
them to a “price squeeze” in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. They assert that
such a claim can arise when a vertically integrated firm sells inputs at wholesale
and also sells finished goods or services at retail. If that firm has power in the
wholesale market, it can simultaneously raise the wholesale price of inputs and
cut the retail price of the finished good. This will have the effect of “squeezing”
the profit margins of any competitors in the retail market.”5
In the Trinko case, Verizon, the incumbent VIP, was accused of raising the cost of its
rival by degrading the quality of access provided to that rival, and therefore making it more
difficult to compete against Verizon.6 This, of course, is a form of non-price discrimination
or sabotage that can arise when wholesale prices are “too low” relative to retail prices.
“The complaint . . . alleged that Verizon had filled rivals’ orders on a discrimi-
natory basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage customers from
becoming or remaining customers of competitive LECs, thus impeding the com-
petitive LECs’ ability to enter and compete in the market for local telephone
service.”7
Regulators in the telecommunications industry have recognized the importance of being
proactive in preventing a price squeeze through price-floor constraints. However, to date they
5Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications (2009).
6In a similar context, the antitrust division of the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it was
investigating whether the data caps instituted by AT&T and Comcast are intended to discourage their
customers from switching to online video providers such as Netflix and Hulu. See Catan & Schatz, 2012.
7Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko (2004).
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have not taken into consideration the need to prevent non-price discrimination through price-
ceiling constraints. While the preponderance of competitor complaints about the behavior
of the incumbent providers concern allegations of non-price discrimination, the competitors’
regulatory advocacy focuses almost exclusively on securing the lowest possible prices for
essential inputs.8 And yet, lower input prices can lead to higher costs for competitors by
encouraging the VIPs to engage in non-price discrimination. Therefore, the results of our
study can be applied to assist regulatory authorities to recognize different possible forms of
market exclusion in a particular industry and seek for proper solutions to prevent inefficient
completion.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper explores the relationship between upstream input prices and downstream market
exclusion under a Stackelberg quantity competition framework. Inefficient foreclosure can
arise when input prices are “too high” and sabotage can arise when input prices are “too low.”
Upper and lower-bound displacement ratios are used to generate a range of non-exclusionary
input prices. The admissible range of the ratio of downstream to upstream margins is de-
creasing in the degree of product homogeneity and reduces to a single ratio in the limit as the
products become perfectly homogeneous. This single margin ratio preserves equality between
the VIP’s wholesale and retail “price-cost” margins. A key finding for competition policy is
that the bounds of non-exclusionary input prices are markedly wider under Bertrand-Nash
competition than they are under Stackelberg competition. Hence, it is critical that the
antitrust and regulatory authorities understand the nature of the industry competition so
that rules governing permissible conduct are properly calibrated to yield efficient outcomes.
Regulators may choose to complement price-floor constraint with a price-ceiling constraint
in order to prevent both forms of market exclusion. However, whether they should take
8See, for example, Kahn et al., 1999, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion (2002), and Tardiff, 2002.
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proactive measures to protect against these types of market exclusion, while important and
interesting, is beyond the scope of this chapter.
It would be interesting for future research to further explore the range of non-exclusionary
input prices under more general technologies, non-constant displacement ratios, and different
game structures. Changing the structure of the analysis is expected to have a quantitative
effect on the range of non-exclusionary input prices, but would not alter the key qualitative
implications for competition policy.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1
dQV (P V , P I) =
∂QV
∂P V
dP V +
∂QV
∂P I
dP I . (A.1)
Set dQV = 1 and dP V = 0 yields
dP I =
(
∂QV
∂P I
)−1
. (A.2)
Also,
dQI(P I , P V ) =
∂QI
∂P V
dP V +
∂QI
∂P I
dP I . (A.3)
Set dP V = 0, and substituting for dP I yields
∣∣dQI∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂QI∂P I dP I
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∂Q
I
∂P I/
∂QV
∂P I
∣∣∣∣∣ . (A.4)
Proof of Lemma 2.2
dQV (P V , P I) =
∂QV
∂P V
dP V +
∂QV
∂P I
dP I . (A.5)
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Set dQV = 1 and dP I = 0 yields
dP V =
(
∂QV
∂P V
)−1
. (A.6)
Also,
dQI(P I , P V ) =
∂QI
∂P V
dP V +
∂QI
∂P I
dP I . (A.7)
Recognizing that dP I =
∂P I
∂P V
dP V and substituting for dP V yields
∣∣dQI∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ ∂QI∂P V dP V + ∂QI∂P I ∂P I∂P V dP V
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
 ∂QI
∂P V
+
∂QI
∂P I
∂P I
∂P V
/∂QV
∂P V
∣∣∣∣∣ . (A.8)
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Totally differentiating (2.9) and (2.10) with respect to d yields the linear system A.X = B:
A X B︷ ︸︸ ︷
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂2ΠV
(∂P V )2
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂2ΠV
∂P V ∂P I
∂2ΠI
∂P I∂P V︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂2ΠI
(∂P I)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
−

︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂P V
∂d
∂P I
∂d
 =
︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0∂QI
∂P I
 . (A.9)
Sufficient second-order conditions for a maximum require that
∂2ΠV
(∂P V )2
< 0,
∂2ΠI
(∂P I)2
< 0
and |A| = ∂
2ΠV
(∂P V )2
∂2ΠI
(∂P I)2
− ∂
2ΠV
∂P V ∂P I
∂2ΠI
∂P I∂P V
> 0.
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Appealing to Cramer’s rule yields
∂P I
∂d
=
1
|A|
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2ΠV
(∂P V )2
0
∂2ΠI
∂P I∂P V
∂QI
∂P I
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∂2ΠV
(∂P V )2
∂QI
∂P I
|A| > 0 (A.10)
and
∂P V
∂d
=
1
|A|
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
∂2ΠV
∂P V ∂P I
∂QI
∂P I
∂2ΠI
(∂P I)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
− ∂
2ΠV
∂P V ∂P I
∂QI
∂P I
|A| > 0. (A.11)
since
∂2ΠV
∂P V ∂P I
> 0 when prices are strategic complements.
Proof of Proposition 2.1
From (2.1), the necessary first-order condition for d is given by
ΠVd :
[
∂QI
∂P I
∂P I
∂d
+
∂QI
∂P V
∂P V
∂d
]
(w − c) +QI ∂w
∂P V
∂P V
∂d
+QV
∂P V
∂d
+
[
∂QV
∂P V
∂P V
∂d
+
∂QV
∂P I
∂P I
∂d
]
(P V − c− sV )− C ′(d) ≤ 0
(A.12)
and
d
(
ΠVd
)
= 0. (A.13)
Let k = ∆+ σ−1u , where ∆ ≥ 0. Substituting for σ−1u =
∣∣∣∣∣∂Q
V
∂P I /
∂QI
∂P I
∣∣∣∣∣ = −
(
∂QV
∂P I /
∂QI
∂P I
)
along with w = c+ (∆+ σ−1u )(P V − c− sV ) and (A.12) yields(
∂QI
∂P I
∂P I
∂d
+
∂QI
∂P V
∂P V
∂d
)
(∆+ σ−1u )(P
V − c− sV ) +QI(∆+ σ−1u )
∂P V
∂d
+
(
∂QV
∂P V
∂P V
∂d
+
∂QV
∂P I
∂P I
∂d
)
(P V − c− sV ) +QV ∂P
V
∂d
− C ′(d) ≤ 0.
(A.14)
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Rewrite (A.14) in the following form:
[
∆
(
∂QI
∂P I
∂P I
∂d
)
+
(
∂QI
∂P V
∂P V
∂d
)(
∆−
(
∂QV
∂P I /
∂QI
∂P I
))]
(P V − c− sV )
+QI
(
∆−
(
∂QV
∂P I /
∂QI
∂P I
))
∂P V
∂d
+
∂QV
∂P V
∂P V
∂d
(P V − c− sV ) +QV ∂P
V
∂d
− C ′(d) ≤ 0.
(A.15)
At an optimum for (2.1), ΠVPV = 0 or
∂QI
∂P V
(
∆−
(
∂QV
∂P I /
∂QI
∂P I
))
(P V − c− sV ) +QI
(
∆−
(
∂QV
∂P I /
∂QI
∂P I
))
+
∂QV
∂P V
(P V − c− sV ) +QV = 0.
(A.16)
Substituting (A.16) into (A.15) and appealing to Lemma 2.3 yields
∆
∂QI∂P I ∂P I∂d︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
 (P V − c− sV︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)− C ′(d) ≤ 0. (A.17)
Since ∆ ≥ 0, (A.17) implies that d∗ = 0 by complementary slackness from (A.12)-(A.13).
Proof of Proposition 2.2
From (A.17), ∆ < 0 implies that −C ′(d) < 0⇒ d∗ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
By Proposition 2.1, d∗ = 0 ∀k ≥ σ−1u ⇒ w ≥ w .
By Proposition 2.2, d∗ > 0 ∀k < σ−1u ⇒ w < w. If k > σ−1l then w > w and the P-F
constraint is violated. The result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4
Perfect product homogeneity implies
∣∣QIP I ∣∣ = ∣∣QVP I ∣∣⇒ ∣∣∣∣∂QI∂P I
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂QV∂P I
∣∣∣∣ (A.18)
and ∣∣QIPV ∣∣ = ∣∣QVPV ∣∣⇒ ∣∣∣∣ ∂QI∂P V + ∂QI∂P I ∂P I∂P V
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂QV∂P V
∣∣∣∣ . (A.19)
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives.
(A.18) and (A.19) imply that as θ → 1⇒ σl → σu ≈ 1 and r → r.
Proof of Corollary 2.1
θ → 1⇒ σl → σu ≈ 1. Satisfaction of the P-C and P-F constraints requires that
P V − c− sV
w − c ≤ 1 and
P V − c− sV
w − c ≥ 1⇒
P V − c− sV
w − c = 1⇒ P
V − c− sV = w − c , the
“equal-margin rule.”
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Substituting for w in (2.10), appealing to (2.12) and solving for P I yields
P I =
aI + bI
(
c+ d+ sI + k(P V − c− sV ))+ P V gI
2bI
. (A.20)
Substituting for w and P I along with solving (2.9) and (2.10) simultaneously for the linear
system in (2.11) and (2.12) yields the Nash-equilibrium prices in (2.13) and (2.14).
Proof of Proposition 2.6
Substituting (2.11)-(2.14) into (2.1) yields the VIP’s reduced-form profit function in (2.15).
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Appendix B
Chapter 3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Recognizing that w = c+ k(P V − c− sV ) and ∂w
∂P V
= k, from (3.1), the first-order
condition for QV is given by
∂ΠV
∂QV
= P V − c− sV + ∂P
V
∂QV
(kQI +QV ) = 0. (B.1)
Imposing the condition that the VIP’s profits are non-decreasing in the output of the rival
implies
∂ΠV
∂QI
= kQI
∂P V
∂QI
+ k(P V − c− sV ) +QV ∂P
V
∂QI
≥ 0. (B.2)
Rewrite (B.1) in the following form:
kQI +QV = −
(
P V − c− sV )
∂P V
∂QV
. (B.3)
Substituting (B.3) into (B.2) yields
(P V − c− sV )
(
k −
∂P V
∂QI /
∂P V
∂QV
)
≥ 0. (B.4)
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(B.4) implies that
k = σ−1 ≥
∂P V
∂QI /
∂P V
∂QV
⇒ σu =
∂P V
∂QV /
∂P V
∂QI
. (B.5)
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Recognizing that w = c+ k(P V − c− sV ), ∂w
∂P V
= k, and d = 0, (3.4) yields
∂ΠV
∂QI
= (P I − w − sI) +QI
(
∂P I
∂QI
− k∂P
V
∂QI
)
= 0. (B.6)
From (B.6), the rival’s reaction function can be written as
QI = −
(
P I − w − sI)
∂P I
∂QI
− k∂P
V
∂QI
. (B.7)
Differentiating (B.7) with respect to QV yields
∂QI
∂QV
= −
(
∂P I
∂QV
+
∂P I
∂QI
∂QI
∂QV
− k
(
∂P V
∂QV
+
∂P V
∂QI
∂QI
∂QV
))
∂P I
∂QI
− k∂P
V
∂QI
+
(
P I − w − sI)( ∂2P I
∂QI∂QV
+
∂2P I
(∂QI)2
∂QI
∂QV
− k
(
∂2P V
∂QI∂QV
+
∂2P V
(∂QI)2
∂QI
∂QV
))
(
∂P I
∂QI
− k∂P
V
∂QI
)2 .
(B.8)
Substituting (P I − w − sI) = −QI
(
∂P I
∂QI
− k∂P
V
∂QI
)
from (B.7), rewrite (B.8) in the
following form
∣∣∣∣ ∂QI∂QV
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
k
∂P V
∂QV
− ∂P
I
∂QV
−QI
(
∂2P I
∂QI∂QV
− k ∂
2P V
∂QI∂QV
)
2
(
∂P I
∂QI
− k∂P
V
∂QI
)
+QI
(
∂2P I
(∂QI)2
− k ∂
2P V
(∂QI)2
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (B.9)
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Recognizing that k−1 = σl =
∣∣∣∣ ∂QI∂QV
∣∣∣∣ and solving for σl yields (3.11).
Proof of Proposition 3.1
From (3.5), the necessary first-order condition for d is given by
Ld : −C ′(d) + λ
[
∂2ΠI
∂QI∂d
]
≤ 0 (B.10)
and
d(Ld) = 0. (B.11)
Recognizing that the term in the brackets is an optimized value function and applying the
envelope theorem yields
∂2ΠI
∂QI∂d
= −1. Thus,
Ld : −C ′(d)− λ ≤ 0. (B.12)
Hence,
d∗ =

0
> 0
if λ ≥ 0
if λ < 0
. (B.13)
Recognizing that w = c+ k(P V − c− sV ) and ∂w
∂P V
= k, at an optimum for (3.5), LQI = 0
or
k(P V − c− sV ) + kQI ∂P
V
∂QI
+QV
∂P V
∂QI
+ λ
∂2ΠI
(∂QI)2
= 0, (B.14)
where
∂2ΠI
(∂QI)2
< 0.
Substituting (B.3) into (B.14) yields
(P V − c− sV )
(
k −
∂P V
∂QI /
∂P V
∂QV
)
+ λ
∂2ΠI
(∂QI)2
= 0. (B.15)
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Recognizing that
∂2ΠI
(∂QI)2
< 0, if k ≥
∂P V
∂QI /
∂P V
∂QV︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ−1u
, λ ≥ 0 that implies d∗ = 0 upon appeal to
(B.13).
Proof of Proposition 3.2
If k <
∂P V
∂QI /
∂P V
∂QV
, (B.15) implies that λ < 0 that implies d∗ > 0 upon appeal to (B.13).
Proof of Proposition 3.3
By Proposition 3.1, d∗ = 0 ∀k ≥ σ−1u ⇒ ∀w ≥ w ⇒ ∀r ≤ r. By Proposition 3.2,
d∗ > 0 ∀k < σ−1u ⇒ ∀w < w ⇒ ∀r > r. If k > σ−1l then w > w and the P-F constraint is
violated. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Perfect product homogeneity implies
∂P I
∂QI
=
∂P V
∂QI
=
∂P I
∂QV
(B.16)
and
∂P V
∂QV
=
∂P I
∂QV
=
∂P V
∂QI
. (B.17)
(B.16) and (B.17) imply
∂P I
∂QI
=
∂P V
∂QI
=
∂P I
∂QV
=
∂P V
∂QV
. (B.18)
Recognizing that the second-partial derivatives of retail prices are continuous, appealing to
Young’s Theorem, differentiating (B.18) with respect to QI yields
∂2P I
(∂QI)2
=
∂2P V
(∂QI)2
=
∂2P I
∂QI∂QV
=
∂2P V
∂QI∂QV
. (B.19)
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Appealing to (B.18), (B.5) yields
σu =
∂P V
∂QV /
∂P V
∂QI
= 1. (B.20)
Appealing to (B.18)-(B.19), (3.11) yields
σl =
∣∣∣∣ ∂QI∂QV
∣∣∣∣ = 2
∣∣∣∣∂P I∂QI +QI ∂2P I(∂QI)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣−∂P
I
∂QI
−
[
9
(
∂P I
∂QI
)2
+ 4
(
QI
∂2P I
(∂QI)2
)2
+ 12QI
∂P I
∂QI
∂2P I
(∂QI)2
]1/2∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (B.21)
Recognizing that
∂P I
∂QI
= −α and ∂
2P I
(∂QI)2
= β, where α and β are non-negative, rewrite
(B.21) in the following form yields
σl =
∣∣∣∣ ∂QI∂QV
∣∣∣∣ = 2
∣∣−α +QIβ∣∣∣∣∣α− [9 (−α)2 + 4 (QIβ)2 − 12QIαβ]1/2∣∣∣ = 2
∣∣−α +QIβ∣∣∣∣∣α− [(3α− 2QIβ)2]1/2∣∣∣ = 1.
(B.22)
(B.20) and (B.22) imply that as θ → 1, σl → σu ≈ 1 and r → r.
Proof of Corollary 3.1
θ → 1⇒ σl → σu ≈ 1. Satisfaction of the P-C and P-F constraints requires that
P V − c− sV
w − c ≤ 1 and
P V − c− sV
w − c ≥ 1⇒
P V − c− sV
w − c = 1⇒ P
V − c− sV = w − c , the
“equal-margin rule.”
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